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ABSTRACT
The  landscape  of  South  African  National  Development  Finance  Institutions  (DFIs)  is
comprised of  twelve  entities.  Their  institutional  objectives  range from supporting  farmers,
financing  industrialisation,  infrastructural  development,  and  promoting  financial  inclusion.
These  DFI  objectives  fall  under  the  umbrella  of  Private  Sector  Development  (PSD)
interventions. Literature established that the success of PSD is contingent on effective impact
evaluation. Consequently, the main research question explored in this dissertation is: In what
ways, and using what tools and systems, do South African DFIs measure the development
impact of their investments? In support of the main question, two sub-questions were are also
investigated. Firstly, whether impact evaluation systems provide credible, timely and relevant
information.  Secondly, whether  impact evaluation systems support evidence-based decision
making and learning. In response to these questions, a qualitative case study of six National
DFIs was carried out.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted with DFI staff  members
involved in impact evaluation. This was supported by secondary data from annual reports and
organisational  websites.  It  was  established  that,  firstly,  DFIs  use non-uniform impact
evaluation  systems  and  tools  to  measure  the  impact  of  their  investments.  Secondly,  the
systems lack qualitative detail and focus on measuring outputs instead of outcomes. Thus,
much emphasis is placed on monitoring instead of impact evaluation. This renders the impact
evaluation systems and tools highly ineffective. Finally, whilst the avowed objective of DFIs is
development,  financial  viability  takes  precedence  when  selecting  projects.  Therefore,  an
emerging conclusion was that systems in place do not support development impact evidence-
based  decision-making.  These  findings  generated  recommendations  for  changing  the
development impact evaluation tools and systems used by South African National DFIs. It is
expected that recommended changes will maximise DFI socio-economic benefits.
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1 Introduction
The concept of development dates back to the end of World War II. Whilst the Marshall Plan
sought to rebuild Europe it soon transformed into a global movement. Besides, early ideas of
development  were  fixated  on  economic  growth  through  finance  and  capital  investment
(Sagasti, Bezanson, & Prada, 2005). Fast forward to the 21st century, there is an increasing
awareness that finance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic development
(Levere, Schweke, & Woo, 2006). Most tellingly, the global financial crisis of 2008 brought to
the  fore  the  pernicious  effects  of  unrestrained  finance  (Ashman,  Mohamed,  &  Newman,
2013). Nonetheless, development finance remains an important developmental factor.
In recognition of the developmental effects of finance, an institutional architecture to provide
development finance has sprouted over the years. From multi-lateral institutions to private
philanthropy, the global landscape of DFIs has undergone massive disjointed and accretive
growth (Sagasti  et  al.,  2005). Unsurprisingly,  the institutions, instruments and practices of
organisations  making  up  the  global  development  finance  system  exhibit  significant
heterogeneity. Because of this, a conception of DFIs for this dissertation is apposite.
This dissertation adopts Mudaliar, Moynihan, Bass, Roberts, and DeMarsh’s (2016) definition
of  DFIs.  According  to  them,  a  DFI  is  a  government-supported  financial  institution  which
provides finance to the private sector for investments that promote positive social, economic
and environmental impacts. Similarly, Gumede, Govender, and Motshidi (2011) define DFIs as
government  policy  tools  for  forging  developmental  objectives  by  addressing  market
imperfections  through  providing  finance  and  investment  capital.  To  them,  developmental
objectives are economic growth and contributions to the public good. Because the aim of
DFIs is to provide finance, the role of finance in development must be explored further.
Finance can be defined as money in all its forms, including credit. The notion of whether more
financial resources equate to more development has dominated discourse amongst scholars
for  many  years (De  Gregorio  &  Guidotti,  1995) (Bruck,  1998). Mainstream  economists
consider it a critical element for development. In contrast, heterodox economists like Raworth
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(2017) argue that far from being infallible, finance immanently generates instability. For South
Africa, racial access to finance was one of the undesirable legacies of apartheid. However,
unequal access to finance together with white monopoly capital was not radically transformed
at the time of political settlement in 1994 (Ashman, Fine, & Newman, 2011).
Additionally,  Ashman et al.,(2011) posit  that at  the dawn of democracy in 1994, the ANC
discarded  its  original  ‘interventionist’  policies  to  address  the  structural  weaknesses  of
apartheid  in  favour  of  neoliberalism—especially  the  belief  in  private-sector  development.
Accordingly, this policy stance maintained and sustained exclusionary, state dependent and
highly  extractive  apartheid-style  economic  development.  This  economic  policy  has  been
central to reproducing income and wealth inequality (Ashman et al., 2011). To date, the South
African economy is  deeply  entrenched  with  exclusionary  characteristics  (Cornish-Jenkins,
2015). Therefore, South African DFIs operate in an economic environment of unequal power.
Furthermore, historical reasons have conjured disparate institutions emblematic of political
conditions prevailing at each epoch.
South African National  DFIs (all  of  which are government owned) are the subject  of  this
dissertation.  The  landscape  of  South  African  National  DFIs  comprises  twelve  institutions
(Julies,  2017).  A  historically  intuitive  way  of  classifying  them  is  to  delineate  between
apartheid-established  and  post-apartheid  established  institutions.  The  three  largest  DFIs
(Development  Bank  of  South  Africa  (DBSA),  Land  Bank  and  the  Industrial  Development
Corporation (IDC)) control up to 90% of DFI assets and were established during the apartheid
era  (Julies, 2017). For this reason, they were included in the study sample. The remaining
nine institutions from which three more DFIs were selected for study based on their Public
Finance Management Act (PFMA) listing were established post-apartheid. In their totality, the
selected institutions are at the core of providing development finance in South Africa. Suffice it
to  say,  however,  that  the  provision  of  state  funds  for  development  has  exacerbated  the
financialisation of the South African economy (Ashman et al., 2011).
At a policy level, the expansion of the DFI system in South Africa has been in response to the
conundrum of establishing a black capitalist class in the face of constrained property rights.
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As a result, a black state-sponsored financialised elite has emerged  (Ashman et al., 2011)
(Alami, 2018). For instance, the NEF has funded billion Rand black economic empowerment
deals over the years  (National  Empowerment Fund, 2016).  Because of  this,  the financial
sector  has  expanded  rapidly  in  the  post-apartheid  era.  DFIs  have  contributed  to  this
expansion.  In  part  because  finance  influences  the  speed  and  spatial  relations  of
accumulation, and hence its use as a policy tool (Powell, 2013). Consequently, a scheme of
finance-led development has been on the rise. For DFIs, finance-led development takes the
form of Private Sector Development (PSD) (Bracking & Ganho, 2011).
Private Sector Development (PSD) is defined by Bracking  (2009,  p.  140) as,  “policies and
resources aimed at developing and expanding the private sector”. Two broad categories of
PSD objectives can be identified:  firm or  sector  level  interventions on the one hand and
economy-wide interventions on the other  (Bracking & Ganho, 2011).  The former objective
seeks to leverage entrepreneurial skills and considers the pursuance of profit synonymous
with development.  The latter considers PSD as capable of correcting market  failures and
positively impacting on poverty and social well-being (Bracking & Ganho, 2011). It is this view
of PSD as a policy measure which renders its impact evaluation fundamental.
Impact  evaluation  is  a  deliberate  attempt  at  promoting  evidence-based  policy  making.  It
promotes accountability, transparency and learning (Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings, &
Vermeersch, 2016).  DFIs are established to bring about social  change. A key question is
whether DFI investments actually bring about improved outcomes. To determine this, impact
evaluations must be undertaken. Accordingly,  Gertler et al., (2016) define impact evaluation
as  an assessment  of  changes  in  the  well-being  of  individuals  attributable  to  a  particular
project,  programme or policy.  Thus, impact evaluation systems are the tools and systems
used by DFIs for outcome assessment (Lemma, 2015).
Established DFIs in  the Global  North have developed sophisticated systems such as the
Development  Effectiveness  Rating  (DEra©),  the  Development  Outcome  Tracking  System
(DOTS) and the Transition Impact Monitoring System (TIMS) for this purpose. However, in the
Global  South  in  general  and  South  Africa  in  particular,  local  DFIs  have  underdeveloped
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impact evaluation systems (Qobo & Motsamai, 2014) (Julies, 2017).  There are a myriad of
reasons  for  this,  chief  of  which  is  inadequate  resources  and  limited  political  pressure  to
implement such systems despite their immense value.
Impact evaluation systems are critical for teaching DFIs what works as well as what doesn’t,
with the result that firm behaviour can be changed (McKenzie, 2010). Whilst research on the
(DOTS), Dera© and TIMS highlight some of the effects of these systems on present and
future investment decisions there is no clarity from a South African perspective.  However,
these systems and many others in general focus on similar indicators or outcomes.
Indicators  or  outcomes  embody  the  evaluation  question  of  an  impact  evaluation  system
(Gertler  et  al.,  2016).  In the context of  DFIs,  the questions are framed to interrogate the
impact or causal effect of an investment on outcomes of interest. Therefore, the unambiguous
definition of indicators is very important (Gertler et al., 2016). Likewise, it must be possible to
estimate the counterfactual or what the outcome would have been in the absence of the DFI
investment.  The  main  outcomes  explored  by  DFIs  are:  employment  generation,
government/tax  revenues,  investment  outcomes,  environmental  outcomes  and  catalytic
effects (Runde, 2016).
Whilst development indicators, mandates and historical accounts of South African DFIs are
well laid out, it is unclear what impact evaluation systems are used to measure development
impact (Qobo & Motsamai, 2014). Moreover, the effect of DFI decisions on key stakeholders
is  unclear,  particularly  how  DFIs  evaluate  the  harmful  and  beneficial  effects  of  their
investments.  For  this  reason,  causality  and  attribution  of  DFI  interventions  to  certain
outcomes is hard to establish (Qobo & Motsamai, 2014). Therefore, this research will add to
this  field  of  knowledge.  It  is  expected that  a theory on how South African National  DFIs
measure the impact of their investments will emerge. The aim is to establish the nature of the
systems in place and how they affect key decisions and promote the well-being of South
Africans. To this end, this dissertation seeks to explore the tools and systems used by South
African DFIs to measure the development impact of their investments.
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1.1 Problem Statement
The contributions of DFIs to economic development must be measured to inform policy and
influence their behaviour. This is achievable if  impact data is collected at certain intervals
during the investment cycle (Bracking & Ganho, 2011).  Prior to this,  an evaluation of the
development impact assessment systems and tools  is essential.  Such systems and tools
collect and analyse the development impact data. From a review of literature, there are no
systematic studies of this nature in South Africa, a finding supported by Abrahams  (2015).
Prior studies have focused on impact  evaluation systems used by European DFIs.  Other
studies have looked at the economic contribution of a DFI in South Africa (Abrahams, 2015).
Moreover,  studies  of  the  internal  operations  of  South  African  DFIs  remain  largely
unresearched. Therefore, this dissertation addresses this problematic gap in literature.
1.2 Research Questions
Based on the problem statement, the open and overarching research question in the literature
adapted  from  Bracking  and  Ganho  (2011) is:  In  what  ways,  and  using  what  tools  and
systems,  do  South  African  DFIs  measure  the  development  impact  of  their  investments?
Additionally, two sub-questions are explored: Firstly, do impact evaluation systems adopted by
South African National DFIs provide credible, timely and relevant information? Secondly, do
impact evaluation systems adopted by South African DFIs support evidence-based decision
making and learning?
1.3 Justification of the Study
It is  intellectually worthwhile  to evaluate the development impact assessment tools used by
South African DFIs because such tools contribute to their efficiency and effectiveness. This
view is supported by Ferraz and Coutinho  (2017). According to them, if DFIs are to serve
public interests they ought to undertake ex-post and ex-ante impact evaluation. Moreover,
other  studies  in  South  Africa  have  identified  some  limitations  of  the  tools  in  use  and
recommended it as an area for further study (Abrahams, 2015).
At a policy level, DFIs provide a mechanism for the South African Government to intervene for
social  and  economic  development  (ActionAid  South  Africa,  2013).  What  is  more,  the
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successful  implementation  of  the country’s  latest  economic blueprint  dubbed as  the New
Growth Plan (NGP) hinges on leveraging DFIs (Economic Development Department Republic
of South Africa, 2011). Finally, DFIs are in a unique position of power from which they can
influence  the  impact  investing  market.  For  these  reasons,  their  development  impact
assessments  are  a  useful  tool  for  directing  capital  to  strategic  sectors  of  the  economy
(Bracking & Ganho, 2011). This makes the systematic study of impact evaluation theoretically
significant  towards DFI  government  regulation  polices  not  least  because evidence based
policies are effective at reducing poverty, inequality and improving well-being (Gertler et al.,
2016).
In terms of redistribution, DFIs are considered a fundamental vehicle for channelling South
African Government financial resources to needy communities. This they achieve by providing
funds in support of job creation, affordable housing, agricultural development, small-, micro-
and medium- enterprise development, industrial development and infrastructural development
(ActionAid South Africa, 2013).
However,  as alluded to Bracking and Ganho  (2011) more investments do not necessarily
equate  to  improved  quality  of  life.  In  fact,  sub-optimal  results  often  persist,  manifesting
themselves  in  debt  accumulation,  environmental  damage,  tax  evasion,  corruption,  poor
selection of projects and emaciation of democratic governance (Bracking & Ganho, 2011). To
safeguard against such risks, DFIs must undertake impact evaluations of their investments.
Due  to  this,  this  study  offers  critical  insights  to  help  improve  developmental  outcomes,
accountability and operational effectiveness of DFIs. Finally, this study contributes towards
advocating for standardised impact evaluation systems for use by South African DFIs. This
will allow for comparability and improved accountability amongst DFIs.
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2 Literature review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is arranged in thirteen sections which review key themes in the literature on DFI
impact  evaluation  systems  clustered  around  three  topics.  The  point  of  departure  is  a
background of development and development finance institutions in general. This is covered
in sections 2.2 to 2.4. Following this, the dissertation looks at the literature of finance and
development  and  maps  out  the  landscape  of  South  African  National  DFIs  in  a  political
economy context. These themes are covered in sections 2.5 to 2.8. This paves the way for a
discussion  of  Private  Sector  Development  (PSD)  and  sets  up  a  detailed  review  of
development impact evaluation systems. Sections 2.9 to 2.11 cover those aspects. Finally,
section 12 provides a conclusion and section 13 articulates the conceptual framework before
looking at detailed case descriptions in chapter 3.
2.2 A Historical Background of Development and Development Finance
Initial ideas of development in the Global North during the 1940s and 1950s were fixated on
economic growth. Development was perceived as tantamount to economic growth (Sagasti et
al., 2005). Thus, economic models of the time viewed the dearth of investment as a major
constraint to economic growth and development. More so, given the abundance of labour in
developing  countries.  Subsequently,  the  1950s  and  1960s  engendered  some  sort  of
fundamentalism under  which  finance  was  considered  a  sufficient  condition  for  economic
development (Sagasti et al., 2005). In contrast, the 1960s and 1970s saw a transformation in
developmental  thinking  from  merely  finance  and  investment  towards  the  interaction  of
numerous factors.  For  instance,  the  importance of  labour  quality,  technological  skills  and
government policies (Sagasti et al., 2005) (Levere et al., 2006).
Contemporary  economists  recognise  the  limitations  of  growth  and  finance.  To  exemplify,
Raworth (2017) propounds that a twenty-first-century goal of economics should be to create a
world in which people can live a life of dignity, opportunity and community within planetary
confinements. This sentiment is supported by the findings of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi (2009)
Commission. What is more, far from being infallible, finance has proven to be an immanent
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generator of instability  (Raworth, 2017). Indeed, the 2008 global financial crisis is a case in
point. As a result, a key theme that has emerged is of finance being a necessary but not
sufficient condition for economic development.
2.3 The Global Landscape of Development Finance Institutions
The rapid growth in the developmental  sector has brought together the state,  the private
sector and civil society in relationships that are both antagonistic and collaborative (Sagasti et
al., 2005). The global development finance system comprises nine types of institutions. These
are:  multilateral  development  banks,  sub-regional  banks,  bilateral  institutions,  national
development banks, private/ commercial sector banks, microfinance institutions, global funds,
NGOs and private philanthropy (Kabinga, 2017). Figure 1 illustrates the typology of entities
involved in development finance.
The  dominance  of  Northern  firms  and  ideologies  in  the  system  of  development  finance
highlights its immanently capitalist and imperialist nature. Thus as Bracking (2009, p. 2) puts
it, ‘development is intimately connected and implicated in capitalist process and imperialist
logic’.  Because  of  this,  an  initial  argument  is  that  the  institutional  systems  of  DFIs  are
inherently meant to benefit the rich. Therefore, an analysis of their impact evaluation systems
is of scholarly significance as it can illuminate weaknesses and propose policy changes which
can benefit subaltern groups.
8
The Global Development Finance System
Figure 1: The Global Development Finance System
Source: (Kabinga, 2017)
This dissertation will focus on National Development Banks as illustrated in the fourth column of Figure 1.
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2.4 An Outline of Development Finance Institutions
Three characteristic features of DFIs are that they are state owned, engage in private sector
development and aim to catalyse other forms of development finance. According to Runde
(2016), DFIs are government-backed institutions that invest in private-sector projects in low-
income  and  middle-income  countries.  A  similar  characterisation  of  DFIs  is  made  by
Kingombe, Massa and Willem (2011) who depict DFIs as donor country owned entities which
provide finance to the public or private sector from callable capital or endowments, and also
leverage other sources of finance such as private capital. A more benevolent characterisation
of DFIs is painted by Levere, Schweke and Woo (2006) who see DFIs as advisors between
financial market capitalists and low income entrepreneurs. Similarly, Ngozo (2017) and Baloyi,
Manyathi, and Mpangase  (2011) recognise DFIs as intermediaries between public aid and
private investment. These varying definitions demonstrate the evolution of DFI objectives and
the variegated nature of their areas of influence. What is conspicuous in the definitions is their
influence on the private sector.
Beyond economic growth, serving marginalised communities and catalysing other forms of
development finance, DFIs are also considered as market “makers”. Market making is the
ability of facilitating the inclusion of individuals, firms and communities which would otherwise
have been excluded in economic transactions into the mainstream economy (Levere et al.,
2006).  This  view of  DFIs  is  reinforced  by  Bracking  (2009) who  states  that  development
finance is responsible for making and expanding markets.
Because of their market-making ability, in weak and incomplete markets where elites have
large arbitrary powers, DFIs enter the market with two seemingly conflicting objectives. On
the one hand is the objective of making profit which is measurable and material whilst on the
other is the desire to portray a notion of benevolent development assistance. Reconciling
these two is problematic because measures of  development are predominantly normative
(Bracking,  2009).  Resultantly,  DFIs  end  up  promoting  the  social  positions  of  elites  and
reproducing  poverty  and  inequality.  For  this  reason,  the  development  impact  evaluation
systems used by DFIs are important since they enable assessments to be made of whose
interests DFIs promote.
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2.5 The Role of Finance in Development
Another view of DFIs is that they aim to address financial market imperfections. This view is
premised on the assumption that challenges in developing countries stifle financial market
development and consequently economic growth (Kabinga, 2017). Runde (2016) has echoed
similar sentiments by noting that in developing countries, capital markets are predominantly
shallow and thus result  in  high interest  rates for  borrowers and circumscribed interest  in
providing  funding  to  small  enterprises.  Consequently,  these  challenges  give  rise  to  high
transaction costs.
The  argument  then  goes  that  development  finance  – and  finance  in  general  – reduces
transaction  costs.  This  is  achievable  through the  mobilisation  of  financial  resources  from
savers to users of funds, intermediation by matching users of funds and suppliers of loanable
funds, maturity transfer through transformation of short-term financial instruments into long-
term financial instruments and through risk transfer. Therefore, it is through this process that
economic growth is engendered. Such a traditional view of finance has been dispelled by
other writers and is dealt with in more detail in the next section.
Raworth (2017) makes three convincing arguments supported by the experiences of the 2008
financial crisis. Firstly, she recognises that far from acting as intermediaries between savers
and borrowers, banks create money out of thin air by merely recording a liability of the loan
withdrawn and a debit of the expected repayment. Secondly, deepened financial markets are
not supportive of economic stability but rather heighten the risk of financial instability. Lastly,
instead of promoting productivity and growth, finance has turned out to be predatory to the
wide-economy.  Far  from  creating  any  value,  finance  extracts  value  from  the  economy.
Furthermore,  in  financialised  economies,  financial  institutions  are  regulators  of  firm  and
individual behaviour as opposed to intermediaries between savers and productive sectors of
the economy (Ashman et al., 2013).
Therefore, finance, in a profound way, reinforces income and wealth inequality, a position
succinctly  summed  up  by  Parker  (2018).  He  argues  that  the  underlying  assumptions  of
finance  reinforce  income and  wealth  inequality  by  pre-supposing  that  some members  of
society have money or capital and others don’t. Furthermore, returns on finance are higher if
inequality is high. That said, such views on finance run in stark contrast to what is expected of
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DFIs, for instance Ngozo  (2017) posits that DFIs play a salient role in catalysing industrial
development,  positively  influencing  the  implementation  of  developmental  policies,  human
resources development and economic growth. As a result, a study of the development impact
evaluation  systems  used  by  DFIs  can  provide  insights  into  the  role  of  finance  in  the
development process and whether DFIs finance development or develop finance.
For instance, one of the most erudite writers on DFIs, Bracking (2012), notes that numerous
countries in the world have DFIs whose objective is to stimulate the growth of the private
sector in developing countries by placing investments in equity and debt. However, in her
earlier work, Bracking (2009) argues that development banks and generic banks are similar
because they all seek to make profitable investments. But then, development banks have the
additional advantage of the charitable label. This often masks their role in reproducing poverty
and inequality or in developing finance. Therefore, DFIs are active participants in capitalist
development. Their favoured instrument of PSD is nothing more than a deliberate effort to
extend  the  influence  of  capitalism  (Bracking,  2009).  For  this  reason,  DFI  developmental
impact needs to be critiqued. A starting point is reviewing the tools and methods used to
measure impact.
2.6 The Political Economy of South African Development
The relationship between the development finance system, capitalism and imperialism has
been  briefly  explored.  South  Africa,  however,  introduces  an  additional  dimension  to  this
relationship owing to its history of apartheid. Modern day South Africa was wrought out of the
exclusionary system of apartheid. The new power formed following the defeat of apartheid
conforms to what Bracking (2009) characterises as an assemblage of a group to manage the
common affairs of an enlarged elite. This is evidenced by the significant number of South
Africans on the  Forbes billionaires  list.  The  list  shows that  up  to  20% of  the  24 African
billionaires are South African (Nsehe, 2017). But why does this matter?
In this dissertation, DFIs are characterised as crucial institutions representing the power and
interests of the rich and privileged. DFIs have the capacity to tip the balance of power in
favour of  elites who then manage to collect  sovereign asset  rents  (Bracking,  2009).  That
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South African institutions generally serve the interests of the rich is evidenced by the report of
Sulla and Zikhali (2018) which shows that South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in
the world. Moreover, consumption, wealth and wage inequality has been on the rise since
1994.  Bracking  (2009) sums up contemporary South Africa as:  de-industrialising,  inept  at
service  delivery  to  the  majority,  lacking  corporate  and state  accountability,  susceptible  to
periodic currency crashes and hell-bent on inflation targeting whilst accruing significant levels
of  foreign  debt.  These  ingredients  are  a  perfect  combination  for  economic  and  social
underdevelopment for the majority.
Suffice it to say that the rich in South Africa have been the former beneficiaries of apartheid
who have allied with the ruling black elites. Elitism should be viewed from the lens espoused
by Bracking (2009). In her treatise, it is argued that the political economy of development is
two-pronged, on the one hand is the ‘crisis but salvation narrative’ and on the other is the
‘resistance but subordination’. The former argues for external intervention in the solution of
problems  bedeviling  people  in  the  Global  South  whereas  the  latter  – which  has  been
popularised by liberation movements – posits that populations in the Global South are fiercely
against capitalism in its current form but then are powerless to be independent of it. However,
what is missing from the second narrative is the contribution by African liberation movements
to the current crisis.
Thus, as the ANC fiercely fought apartheid, in contemporary times it has become a formidable
player in the capitalist system through its participation in the process of power which has
trapped the South African population into a vicious cycle of widespread poverty, inequality and
massive  levels  of  unemployment  (Bracking,  2009).  As  argued by  Gumede et  al.,  (2011),
debates on the effectiveness of DFIs in helping achieve developmental goals are about the
interaction  of  the  state,  markets  and  private  actors.  Bracking  (2009) concurs  with  this
argument  by  recognising  that  the  value  of  money  only  ever  exists  because  of  state
guarantees and the role the state plays as intermediary of class power in society. It is within
this political-economy context that DFIs operate in South Africa—arguably the right conditions
for developing finance as opposed to financing development; a matter to be explored further
in this dissertation.
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2.7 The Landscape of South African National DFIs
The  landscape  of  South  African  National  DFIs  which  forms  the  population  of  this  study
comprises three major institutions reported on separately by National Treasury. These are the
Industrial  Development  Corporation  (IDC),  the  Land  Bank and the  Development  Bank  of
South  Africa  (DBSA)  (National  Treasury,  2017).  In  addition  to  this,  there  are  up  to  ten
relatively small  National  DFIs.  The number of  South African DFIs has increased over the
years in tandem with the broader neoliberal economic order pursued by the South African
Government. Neoliberalism is a class project which has seen the balance of power shift from
labour to capital (Ashman et al., 2011). As a result, the South African Government has had to
establish more DFIs to provide finance for development. Moreover, DFIs have increasingly
been viewed as the conduit  for development finance to needy communities  (Baloyi et  al.,
2011). Table 1 provides a summary of South African National DFIs and their mandates.
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South African National DFIs
# DFI Name Date
established
Mandate PFMA Listing1
1 Industrial
Development
Corporation (IDC)
October 1, 1940 Promoting  economic  growth  and  industrialisation
in  South  Africa  and  the  rest  of  the  continent
(Industrial Development Corporation, 2017).
Schedule  2  Major  public
entity
2 Land  and
Agricultural
Development
Bank  of  South
Africa
1912 Providing  financial  services  to  the  commercial
farming sector and to agri-business and to make
available  new,  appropriately  designed  financial
products that would facilitate access to finance by
new  entrants  to  agriculture  from  historically
disadvantaged backgrounds (Land Bank, 2018).
Schedule  2  Major  public
entity
3 Development
Bank of Southern
Africa
June 30, 1983 Delivering  developmental  infrastructure  in  South
Africa  and  the  rest  of  the  African  continent
(Development Bank of Southern Africa, 2017).
Schedule  2  Major  public
entity
4 National  Housing
Finance
Corporation
(NHFC)
1996 Make housing finance affordable and accessible to
individuals and households with monthly incomes
between R1500 and R15 000 per month (National
Housing Finance Corporation Soc LTD, 2017).
Schedule  3A  National
public entity
5 Small  Enterprise
Finance Agency (
sefa)
1 April, 2012 To foster the establishment, survival and growth of
SMMEs  and  Co-operatives,  and  thereby
contributing  towards  poverty  alleviation  and  job
Schedule  2  Major  public
entity2
1 Refers to classification according to the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)
2 Subsidiary of the IDC but under the executive authority of the Department of Small Business Development
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# DFI Name Date
established
Mandate PFMA Listing
creation (Small Enterprise Finance Agency, 2017).
6 National
Empowerment
Fund (NEF)
1998 Promoting  and  facilitating  black  economic
participation through the provision of financial and
non-financial  support  to  black  empowered
businesses, as well as by promoting a culture of
savings  and  investment  among  black  people
(National Empowerment Fund, 2016).
Schedule  3A  National
public entity
7 Independent
Development
Trust (IDT)
1990 A  social  infrastructure  programme  and  project
management implementing agency that works with
all  spheres of  government through client-specific
service  level  agreements  on a  management  fee
basis (Independent Development Trust, 2017).
Schedule  2  Programme
Implementation Agency
8 National  Youth
Development
Agency (NYDA)
16 June, 2009 Development of an Integrated Youth Development
Strategy  (IYDS)  for  South  Africa  and  initiating,
designing, coordinating, evaluating and monitoring
all programmes that aim to integrate the youth into
the  economy  and  society  (National  Youth
Development Agency, 2017).
Act  of  parliament,  Act  no
54 of 2008
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# DFI Name Date
established
Mandate PFMA Listing
9 National  Urban
Reconstruction
and  Housing
Agency
(NURCHA). 
1995 NURCHA  initiates  programmes  and  takes
considered risks to  ensure a sustainable flow of
low-income  and  affordable  housing,  community
facilities and infrastructure (NURCHA, 2017).
Schedule  3A  National
public entity3
10 Rural  Housing
Loan  Fund
(RHLF)
1996 To  facilitate  access  to  housing  finance  for  low
income  earners  in  rural  areas  to  improve  their
living and housing conditions (RHLF, 2017).
Schedule  3A  National
public entity
11 Micro  Agriculture
Finance  Scheme
of  South  Africa
(Mafisa)
2004 To provide financial  services for empowering the
smallholder/micro  level  producers,  processors,
working poor, micro entrepreneurs and producers
in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors.
Fund  no  longer  in
operation
12 Human
Settlements
Development
Bank 
Upcoming
Table 1: South African National DFIs 
3 Partnership between the South African Government and the Soros Economic Development Fund (SEDF). SEDF withdrew from the partnership in 2017.
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2.8 The Financialisation of South Africa’s Development
Hitherto, the overarching theme of South African DFIs is that the provision of finance by the
state  positively  influences development  or  at  least  that  it  influences economic  outcomes.
What form of development does finance foster within the political economy context of South
Africa and how is this measured? Suffice it to say that the use of finance as a tool for effecting
economic development is consistent with neoliberal economic policy (Ashman et al., 2011).
The influential economist, Joseph Schumpeter (1934), is quoted in Storm (2018, p. 304) as
describing the banker as “the ephor of the exchange economy”. Such a view was rooted in
the intuitive idea that credit creation is central to financing new investments and innovative
ideas. Thus, Schumpeter further argued that the banker “makes possible the carrying out of
new combinations,  authorises  people,  in  the  name of  society  as  it  were,  to  form them.”
Moreover, the same banker has ‘‘either replaced private capitalists or become their agent; he
has himself become the capitalist par excellence. He stands between those who wish to form
new combinations and the possessors of productive means”. In sum, Schumpeter viewed
banks as engines of economic growth and technological progression.
Whilst  Schumpeter’s  views  were  premised  on  the  centrality  of  banks  in  bringing  up
development (the so-called bank-based financial system), other scholars such as Von Hayek
(1937) strongly argued that a market-based financial system was superior (Storm, 2018). The
same author quotes Metcalf (2017, para. 23) who summed up Von Hayek’s views on markets
as follows:
the market constitutes the only legitimate form of knowledge, next to which all other
modes of reflection are partial, in both senses of the word: they comprehend only a
fragment of a whole and they plead on behalf of a special interest. Individually, our
values are personal ones, or mere opinions; collectively, the market converts them into
prices, or objective facts
In view of this, the financialisation of ‘everything in everyday life’ ensued. Financialisation is
defined as the growing influence of the owners of money, financial institutions and actors in
the management of economic affairs (Bracking, 2016).
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Financialisation  sustained  and  continues  to  sustain  the  neoliberal  agenda  through  the
promotion of narratives of self-interested individuality and risk-taking (Storm, 2018). Ashman
et al.,  (2011), come to a similar conclusion about neoliberalism and its effect on politics and
identity. The authors argue that neoliberalism in South Africa has resulted in an ideological
shift from participatory democracy and more towards finance and market-led decision making
resulting in citizens becoming mass consumers. Because wages have generally stagnated
over the years, such consumption has been financed by debt. Figure 2 shows the trends in
domestic debt which has been increasing since 2007.
Data Source: SARB
Financialisation is therefore a product of market fundamentalism. But more importantly, the
growth of finance is a key pillar in support of neoliberal economic policy. The pernicious effect
of financialisation has been its metamorphosis into an instrument of power, often hindering
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Figure 2: Trends in Household Debt
social transformation (Storm, 2018).This power is exuded through finance’s ability to ‘define
the value of the future’ as well as controlling human-ecology relations in the present. Further
evidence of financialisation is illustrated in the relative share of finance to total GDP in Figure
3.
Data Source: Stats SA
Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 3, finance, real estate and business services occupy a lion’s
share of total GDP. The question is whether more finance as provided by DFIs is good or bad
for  the  economy and  society.  This  dissertation  considers  this  question  by  reviewing  DFI
development  impact  evaluation  systems.  Most  empirical  evidence  points  towards  more
finance being bad for the economy. For instance, Bracking (2016) noted that rising inequality
and the formation of a 1% elite class in Africa is attributed to financialisation. Storm (2018)
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Figure 3: Finance Contribution to GDP relative to other Sectors
concurs  that  there  is  a  strong  nexus  between  income  and  wealth  inequality  and
financialisation.  South  Africa’s  economic  growth  under  conditions  of  heightened
financialisation has not been exciting either, averaging 2.95% since the year 2000 according
to Stats SA (See Figure 4). Moreover, working class South Africans have been exposed to
debt-peonage.  This  has  degenerated  into  chaos,  for  instance  the  Marikana  massacre  of
August 2012 (Bond, 2013).
Data Source: Stats SA
Ashman et al., (2011) raised five key points outlining the pernicious effects of financialisation,
firstly,  finance curtails the level  and effectiveness of real  investment in favour of  financial
instruments. Figure 5 illustrates annual percentage growth in manufacturing value added in
South Africa. The general trend is that its either been negative or declining. Secondly, finance
subordinates social and economic values to shareholder wealth and financial worth. Thirdly,
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Figure 4: South Africa GDP Growth 2008 to 2018
finance results in public policies being shifted more towards commercialisation and in the
fourth place it is argued that finance extents its influence over economic and social policies.
Lastly,  finance  puts  at  risk  aspects  of  economic  and  social  life  from financial  flux.  Most
importantly, finance has been notorious for exacerbating combined and uneven development
in South Africa and globally (Ashman & Fine, 2013). Given these theoretical propositions on
the negative effects of finance, measuring developmental impact of DFIs is important as more
finance is likely to be harmful. For if the developmental measurement metrics are flawed then
DFIs are likely to develop finance as opposed to financing development.
Data Source: World Bank Development Indicators
Any present-day study of finance ought to recognise globalisation. DFIs manage their funds
and make decisions following market practices  (Bracking & Ganho, 2011). Because of this,
the current era of global finance has seen the traditional intermediary role of banks being
shifted  to  self-regulating  financial  markets.  Moreover,  a  majority  of  people  have  become
‘financially  included’ through  various  schemes such  as  microfinance  and  micro-insurance
(Storm, 2018). South Africa is no exception.
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Figure 5: Manufacturing Value Added Annual Percentage Growth
The  state  has  been  actively  involved  in  this  process  through  the  establishment  of  DFIs
mandated to provide micro-credit or to support small enterprises. Up to half of the 12 South
African DFIs are mandated to provide micro-finance (NHFC,  sefa, NYDA, NURCHA, RHLF
and MAFISA). The efficacy of inclusive finance in development has been hotly contested.
Consequently, there are no conclusive results on the effectiveness of this approach despite it
being instrumental in catalysing other development funds (Bertha Centre for Social Innovation
and Entrepreneurship, 2009).
The genesis of micro-finance has its roots in a model propounded by Dr Muhammad Yunus in
the  early  1970s.  Its  central  dissertation  is  that  poverty  could  be  alleviated  through  self-
employment (perhaps echoing Von Hayek’s principles explored earlier). To promote this idea,
tiny micro-enterprises had to be supported by providing them with small loans.  (Bateman &
Chang,  2012).  This  idea  was  embraced  by  mainstream  economists  and  international
organisations like the World Bank. They agreed with the ethos of the model which focused on
‘self-help and the individual entrepreneur’, much in concurrence with the principles of market
fundamentalism discussed earlier. Kvangraven and dos Santos (2018) support views of how
financial inclusion was popularised, particularly the role played by the World Bank.
Proponents of micro-finance argue that if funding is provided to the poor then they can help
themselves out of  poverty.  However,  this  is rejected by Bateman and Chang  (2012) who
contend  that  whilst  such  a  model  has  limited  short-term  benefits,  in  the  long  run  the
disadvantages far outweigh the benefits. A principal one being its disregard of economies of
scale.  Moreover,  micro-finance  accelerates  the  de-industrialisation  of  local  economies.
Radical  views  by  Nobel  peace  prize  laureate  economist  Stiglitz  (2013,  p.  46) posit  that
financial inclusion is a tool ‘for the 1%’ to further their profits and interests, thus, “each poor
person might have only a little, but there are so many poor people that a little from each
amounts to a great deal”.
Recent  literature has also supported this view, for  instance,  Kvangraven and dos Santos
(2018)  have argued that financial inclusion has failed to deliver on its promises since it is
based on the misplaced assumption that  financial  development is  positively  correlated to
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positive economic development. On this basis, when the state engages in providing micro-
finance as the South African Government is doing through its DFIs, it must be asked whether
it  is  financing development or developing financing.  Thus, as concluded by Bateman and
Chang (2012) microfinance in some way creates an impediment towards inclusive sustainable
social and economic development, a position which will be evaluated in this dissertation by
looking at how the impact of South African DFIs providing micro-finance is measured. This
explains the inclusion of three post-apartheid DFIs (involved in micro-finance and financial
inclusion) in the population under study. Closely linked to micro-finance is a concept at the
heart of all DFIs known as Private Sector Development (PSD).
2.9 Private Sector Development
According to Bracking (2009), PSD refers to policies and resources aimed at developing the
private  sector.  The African Development Bank Group  (2013) argues that  a  strong private
sector  is  critical  for  job creation,  policy reform,  good governance and inclusive economic
growth. Runde  (2016) posits that economic growth and job creation are critical  to ending
extreme  poverty.  Accordingly,  the  private  sector  is  a  key  stakeholder  in  providing  jobs.
Statistics show that the private sector is responsible for providing 9 out of 10 jobs in the
developing  world.  Perry  (2011) has  also  noted  that  private  sector-led  development  has
dominated development theory. Furthermore, assistance to the private sector in overcoming
financial  constraints  and  market  failures  has  the  potential  to  spur  economic  growth  and
reduce poverty.
Bracking and Ganho  (2011) have identified two policy interventions related to PSD. Firstly,
firm- or sector-level interventions and secondly macro-level interventions. In the first instance
the assumption is that profit and development can be achieved at the same time thus chasing
a triple bottom line and in the second instance PSD is aimed at correcting market failures
through investments with unambiguous development and social impact.
The arguments for PSD are directly related to DFI objectives and mandates. In fact, Runde
(2016) argues that DFIs contribute directly to job creation, economic growth and increased
taxes through the provision of finance to the private sector. Therefore, as summarised in Table
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2  we  see  objectives  centred  around  market  making  and  correcting  market  failures.  This
dissertation argues that the main objectives of South African DFIs are in support  of PSD
because  most  of  their  interventions  are  aimed  at  promoting  private  ownership,  private
initiative and risk taking. Table 2 shows all the concepts in PSD interventions (Bracking, 2009,
p. 143).
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DFI objective/ principle Explanation Instrument
Demonstration effect A successful  project  encourages  imitation  by  other
firms
 Setting up a unique commercial venture
 Providing equity, loans and management ( E, L & M)
 ‘Infant industry’ investment
Augmenting capital flows Public  funds  can  provide  critical  weight  to  other
investors’ efforts
 Moderating investment risks
 Improving capital market efficiency
 Being the owner-operator of managed companies
 E, L & M
Enhanced  development
effect
DFIs have singular  interest  in project,  not  a trading
interest
 Leadership
 Provision of hard infrastructure
 Technical assistance, E, L & M
Moderating  investment
risk
Expertise  and  standing  in  relation  to  domestic
government  and  the  capital  markets  provide
insurance against investment and political risk
 Providing a ‘seal of approval’
 Providing an ‘umbrella role’
 Negotiating with government and partners
 Designing and planning projects
 Raising funds in capital markets
Adding value Providing  capital  which  would  otherwise  not  be
available or suitable
 Modifying the risk-reward relationship
 Design, experience, expertise
 Raising capital
Catalytic principle Providing minority stake to catalyse others’ crowding
in
 Leveraging equity by providing core stake
 Providing direct management function
 Securing political ‘go-ahead’
The business principle Funds  are  transferred  under  market  disciplines  to
ensure profitability
 Making up acceptable rates of return
The  principle  of  special
contribution
To supplement, complement but not displace market
operators
 Declaring that others are not willing to participate without DFIs
Table 2: Summary of Concepts in Private Sector Development Interventions
26
A central issue is how to situate PSD within the broad sense of financing development or
developing finance? A similar dichotomy was explored by Bracking (2009, p. 142) when she
investigated whether PSD was instrumental in ‘assisting accumulation - but development?’ It
is arguably true that the ballooning DFIs in South African history belie the commonality of their
intervention which has been predominantly equity and development finance purchases that
are discriminatory and in support of combined and unequal development (Bracking, 2009).
Furthermore, PSD as a neoliberal economic policy instrument reinforces past injustices and
amplifies inequality. This argument is supported by Miraftab (2004) who observed that public-
private pacts and consequently private sector development is at the core of the neoliberal
agenda and its ideology of abdicating the responsibility of providing public goods from the
government.  Hence,  PSD supports  accumulation  or  develops finance.  This  results  in  the
creation of a powerful state-subsidised constituency. For instance, beneficiaries of the Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE) scheme who have been described by Bracking (2009, p. 156)
as the ‘relatively honest ruling elite’.
Another  counterargument  to  the  role  played  by  DFIs  in  PSD  by  providing  resources,
deploying expertise and employing innovative techniques is that  it  results  in the ‘windfall-
waste problem’  (Bracking, 2009, p. 146). This phenomenon relates to a situation whereby
viable projects which could otherwise have been financed by traditional banks are funded by
public  resources  through  DFIs.  In  contradistinction,  the  lack  of  private  appetite  in  some
projects might be because they are not economically viable and unprofitable in the first place.
Consequently, the participation of DFIs in PSD is problematic because DFIs end up either
picking market losers or distorting markets. This makes impact evaluation even more critical.
Given the contrasting views on the developmental effects of the major interventions employed
by DFIs its apposite to question DFI choices and their effect on environmental, social and
economic outcomes. In the same vein, the use of public funds to support profit-making firms
is a contentious matter  whose developmental  impact  is  more challenging to  demonstrate
conceptually and empirically (Perry, 2011). Thus, as argued by Miraftab (2004) public-private
partnerships as engendered by DFIs through PSD schemes can best be described as “Trojan
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Horses” of development. This is so because community interests are often subordinated to
those of the powerful private sector firms. But critically, as argued by Bracking (2009), PSD
does not improve the well-being of Africans in general owing to the oligopolistic nature of their
economies. From a South African perspective, there is conglomerate domination and as such
there are no avenues for the benefits to ‘trickle down’ to ordinary citizens. Given these diverse
views, it is vital to explore development finance impact evaluation systems in detail.
2.10 Development Impact Evaluation Systems
According to Gertler et al., (2016), impact evaluation is an approach to evidence-based policy
making. It is distinct from monitoring and other evaluations. The emphasis is on the causal
effect  of  a  programme  or  intervention  on  an  outcome  of  interest.  Of  importance  is  the
differentiation between monitoring and evaluation. Khandker, Koolwal and Samad  (2010, p.
8),  define monitoring as the process of evaluating set goals,  indicators and targets of  an
intervention whereas an evaluation is ‘a systematic and objective assessment’ of programme
results.
The gist of this dissertation is undergirded by the philosophy propounded by Bracking and
Ganho  (2011).  In  their  treatise,  the  choice  of  DFI  measurement  indicators  is  of  utmost
importance for developmental purposes. This is because it influences investment decisions.
Moreover, evaluation results are a source of critical intelligence for future investments. This
theme of past intelligence informing the future is a view held by McKenzie (2010)  who has
posited that impact evaluations that compare programme outcomes in the presence of an
intervention against conditions in the absence of the intervention help inform “what works”. It
is  important  to  assess  development  evaluation  tools  and  their  design  assumptions  to
determine whether what they measure can be attributed to DFI interventions in a scientific
way.
In sum, the two key arguments put forward by Bracking and Ganho (2011) are that: effective
PSD  is  dependent  on  effective  measurement  tools.  Secondly,  effective  measurement  is
contingent upon the quality of underlying research and assumptions shaping the evaluation
tools. For instance, whilst the DBSA might publish in its annual report that it has disbursed
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and catalysed billions of Rands, the general assumption is that well-being has been improved.
Such an assumption, however, would be weak if there is no subsequent inquiry into the effect
of these disbursements on the most marginalised in society.
The saliency of impact evaluation is amplified further by the fact that DFIs are funded and
guaranteed by public  money.  Therefore,  the use of  public  money to  leverage the private
sector either through subsidies or technical assistance does not generate any measurable
returns for the state whereas the private sector tends to enjoy long term wealth and benefits
from it  (Bracking, 2009). Moreover, measuring development impact improves accountability
and transparency (Runde, 2016). Most of all, what matters to the public is not the popularised
mantra of economic growth and an improved private sector environment but how DFIs impact
environmental, social and economic results (Bracking & Ganho, 2011).
Despite  their  importance,  finance and private  sector  interventions (hereafter  FPD) impact
evaluations  were  not  popular  until  the  2008  financial  crisis  (McKenzie,  2010).  Counter-
arguments dissuading against them were based on the nature of FPD policies and projects.
These  policies  are  often  affected  by  macro-economic  factors  which  are  beyond  their
influence.  Thus,  understanding  attribution  and  additionality  is  a  major  challenge  in
development economics (Runde, 2016). The next question to ask is what development impact
evaluation systems exist for DFIs in general and what assumptions do they make?
The current development finance architecture is dominated by institutions from the North such
as the International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group (IFC) and the CDC Group plc.
Emerging  economies  like  South  Africa  are  increasingly  providing  development  finance
(Runde,  2016).  Owing to  this,  documented DFI  impact  evaluation  tools  are  mainly  those
designed  by  Northern  DFIs.  According  to  Bracking  and  Ganho  (2011),  two  types  of
development impact evaluation tools can be identified in general, and in the first instance are
ex-ante tools.  Ex-ante tools are used for  screening projects based on their  desirability  in
meeting  the  DFIs’  financial  and  developmental  targets.  Secondly,  ex-post  tools  provide
feedback and lessons learnt from investments that were made. Lemma (2015) also concurs
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with the view that there are two types of evaluation. DFIs use these tools in varying forms and
ways to inform their decisions.
At a global level, there are three types of assessment systems used by DFIs: International
Finance  Corporation  (IFC)’s  Development  Outcome  Tracking  System  (DOTS),  Deutsche
Investitions  und  Entwicklungsgesellschaft  (DEG)’s  Development  Effectiveness  Rating
(DERa)© and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)’s Transition
Impact Monitoring System (TIMS) (Kingombe et al., 2011). These three broad systems will be
discussed in detail in the following sections. The CDC, EIB and FMO have their own impact
evaluation  variants.  Bracking  and  Ganho  (2011)  also  identified  three  systems,  albeit
excluding the TIMS but including the UN Global Compact Self-Assessment tool.
International Finance Corporation’s Development Outcome Tracking System (DOTS)
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is a subsidiary of the Word Bank Group. It is the
largest DFI in the world with the exclusive mandate of PSD in developing countries  (About
IFC, 2018).  The DOTS is IFC’s monitoring and evaluation (M & E) system for investments.
According  to  IFC  (2018) the  DOTS  is  lauded  as  the  leading  impact  evaluation  system
amongst international financial institutions. The popularity of the DOTS is also substantiated
by Bracking and Ganho (2011) who noted that the DOTS and GPR are widely supported by
DFIs. Not surprisingly, the Independent Evaluation Group (2013) has identified the IFC as the
leader in monitoring, evaluating and disclosing developmental results.
The DOTS is used to monitor investments from the time of screening and appraisal up until
closure  (Independent  Evaluation  Group,  2013).  However,  the  commencement  time  of
monitoring seems ambivalent.  According to Bracking and Ganho  (2011) one of the major
weaknesses of the DOTS is that it commences after the IFC’s provision of funds. This view is
supported by IFC (2018) which notes that the DOTS commences at the outset of the project
meaning the decision to invest will have already been made.
The  DOTS  has  four  main  performance  categories  on  the  investment  portfolio:  financial
performance,  economic  performance,  environmental  and  social  performance,  and  PSD
impact  (IFC, 2018). Investment staff fill  in baseline, target, and timeline information from a
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pool of more than 300 indicators in conjunction with the client. The indicators are updated on
an annual basis and compared across regions and industries. Projects are positively rated
based on their performance across the four categories. Similarly, development effectiveness
on  the  advisory  services  portfolio  within  the  IFC  is  evaluated  by  aggregating  strategic
relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the services. Table 5 summarises the development
outcomes and development effectiveness categories, general indicators and benchmarks as
well as examples of specific indicators assessed against targets (IFC, 2018, p. 1).
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DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES: INVESTMENTS
Performance Category General  Indicators  and
Benchmarks
Examples  of  Specific  Indicators  Assessed  Against
Targets 
Financial performance Returns to financiers Return  on  invested  capital,  return  on  equity,  project
implemented on time and on budget
Economic performance Returns to society Economic return on invested capital. Numbers of connections
to  basic  services,  loans  to  small  enterprises,  people
employed, tax payments
Environmental  and social
performance
Project meets IFC’s performance
standards
Improvements  in  environmental  and  social  management,
effluent  or  emission  levels,  community  development
programmes
Private  sector
development impact
Project  contributes  to
improvement  for  the  private
sector  beyond  the  project
company
Demonstration  effects,  linkages,  improvements  in
legal/regulatory framework
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS: ADVISORY SERVICES
Strategic relevance Potential  impact  on  local,
regional, national economy
Client contributions, alignment with country strategy
Efficiency Returns  on  investment  in
advisory operations
Cost-benefit ratios, project implemented on time and budget
Outputs,  outcomes,  and
impacts
Project  contributes  to
improvement  for  clients,
beneficiaries,  and  the  broader
private sector
Improvements  in  operations,  investment  enabled,  jobs
created, increase in revenues for beneficiaries, cost savings
from policy reforms
Table 3: IFC's DOTS Performance Indicators
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The  DOTS  is  a  strong  results  measurement  system because  it  is  based  on  timely  and
relevant data. The data is obtained from IFC’s clients and in some instances from audited
financial statements  (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013). In addition, the IFC undertakes
an annual  data quality review which focuses on internal  data integrity and quality control
processes. On the advisory front, the M&E system is incorporated in the project cycle from
inception to completion. On completion, a self-evaluation Project Completion Report (PCR) is
prepared.
According to  an  evaluation  undertaken by  the Independent  Evaluation  Group  (2013),  the
quality of the PCR has been improving and contains appropriate data plus useful lessons for
the future. Furthermore, the M&E system incorporates “reach indicators”. Reach indicators
measure the number of people reached by IFC clients or their dollar benefits irrespective of
IFC’s  investment  size.  Finally,  IFC’s  M&E  system  influences  better  design  and  effective
implementation of future projects using lessons learnt  through clear  objectives and better
corrective action instruments.
On the downside, the M&E system has been criticised for having gaps in the use of indicators
for PSD; this despite PSD being a significant mandate of the IFC. Subsequently, there are
instances  of  mandatory  indicators  for  DOTS  being  insufficient  to  represent  the  project’s
expected development impact. Moreover, the use of proxy figures from the firm’s portfolio
means that  it  has limited knowledge on the underlying results  to its  beneficiaries making
attribution difficult. Regarding the PCR, there is an immanent weakness that judging project
outcomes at the time of completion as well as their medium-to long-term effects is premature.
Bracking and Ganho (2011) have also criticised the DOTS for its main focus on outcomes and
outputs relative to factors relating to financed recipients and mode of supply. Therefore, data
on who receives funds (fund, banks, SME) and how they receive it (equity or loan) is thus not
collected. This might have a bearing on development impact. By the same token, the DOTS
has attributes that are not unambiguously positive thus the indicators cannot be aggregated.
This  ambiguity  means  one  of  two  things,  either  there  is  inconclusive  evidence  on  the
development  effect  of  the  attribute  being  measured or  the  development  effect  is  context
33
dependent. That is, caused by something else or might only work in the absence of some
other factor.
DEG’s Development Effectiveness Rating (DERa)©
DEG is a German DFI which is a subsidiary of KfW. It has been in operation for the past 55
years  (What we do,  2018).  The DERa© is a result of the refinement of DEG’s Corporate
Policy  Project  Rating  (GPR)©.  The  (GPR)©,  was  a  multi-dimensional  index-based
development assessment tool  (KfW DEG, 2018). DERa© is based on the theory of change
methodology.  Under  this  methodology,  causal  linkages  from  DEG  and  its  clients’  initial
activities are used to explain the process towards desired change. Therefore, DEG’s theory of
change spells out what it intends to achieve. This is summed up as provision of more and
better jobs, increasing local income and acting in a sustainable manner to create benefits for
local  communities  (KfW DEG,  2018).  DERa© is  applied  throughout  the  project  life  cycle
including prior to approval.
The DERa© has five key outcome categories which are: decent jobs, local income, market
and  sector  development,  environmental  stewardship  and  community  benefits.  These
outcomes define the design of the DERa©. Each category has a set of mostly quantitative
indicators  which  capture  a  client’s  contribution  to  a  specific  category.  In  addition,  some
indicators are qualitative and require expert judgement  (KfW DEG, 2018). As a result, the
DERa© produces a cumulative score with a maximum of 150 points. The score is linked to a
qualitative category to aid interpretation as shown on Table 7. Owing to the multidimensional
nature of the DERa©, no investment can score 150. In terms of weighting, decent jobs, local
income and market and sector development make up 75% of the weighting with the remaining
25% occupied by environmental stewardship (KfW DEG, 2018).  Table 8 summaries DERa©
assessment fields and the impulses for DEG’s business.
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Categorisation key
Qualitative Categorisation
≥ 100 points Exceptional
85-99 points Very good
70-84 points Good
50-69 points Satisfactory
≤ 49 points Unsatisfactory
Table 4: KfW DEG Categorisation Key
DERa assessment and impulses table
DERa assessment fields Impulses for DEGs business
Decent jobs
 # of jobs
 % job growth
 Indirect job potential
Decent jobs
 Select clients with job potential
 Support  clients’  social
performance
Local income
 Sum of local income
 Annual growth of local income
Local income
 Improve financial sustainability
 Focus on local sourcing
Market and sector development
 Country and sector focus
 Promoting innovation
Market and sector development
 Select  clients  in  LICs  and/or
enabling sectors that innovate
Environmental stewardship
 Environmental responsible
practice
 Avoidance and savings
Environmental stewardship
 Select climate-focused clients
 Supports  clients’  environmental
performance
Community benefits
 Manage community risks
 Proactive  community
development
Community benefits
 Support  clients’  mitigating  and
proactive  local  development
strategies
Table 5: DERa Assessment and Impulses Table
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European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Transition Impact Monitoring
System (TIMS)
The EBRD was founded on the 15th of April  1991. Its founding objective was to assist  in
building a new post-Cold-War era in central and eastern Europe (History of the EBRD, 2018).
For this reason, the mandate of the bank is to facilitate transition to a market economy by
financing certain private sector individual projects (Besley, Dewatripont, & Guriev, 2010). To
achieve this, the DFI developed a monitoring and measurement system known as the TIMS.
Accordingly, and like all other DFIs, the EBRD is a demand-driven institution which makes the
measurement of development impact even more crucial because selected projects must be
(and be seen to be) supporting its mandate.
The EBRD evaluates projects based on three set of criteria: 1) sound banking, 2) additionality,
and 3) transition impact. Sound banking is assessed by measuring the risk-adjusted project
rate of return relative to market rates (Besley et al., 2010). By the same token, additionality is
assessed by evaluating whether the Bank’s funding does not crowd out private capital but
rather increases the stock of capital to finance projects in client countries. Finally, transition
impact  is  measured by  a  separate  transition  impact  measurement  system which  tips  the
balance of project selection in favor of those with high transition impact.
The TIMS has three main elements:  firstly,  it  measures the transition impact  of  individual
projects. This is done by the bank’s Office of the Chief Economist (OCE) which employs the
Stern-Lankes methodology, deemed so because of the seminal paper by Nicholas Stern and
Hans Peter Lankes in 1997. The paper spelt out the way in which the bank would monitor
progress and measure impact (Besley et al., 2010). Transition impact is measured based on
three dimensions: contributions to competitive market structures, contributions to institutions
and  policies  that  support  markets  and  contributions  to  market-based  conduct,  skills  and
innovation.  On this  basis,  projects are ranked excellent/  good/ satisfactory/  negative. The
bank can occasionally accept projects ranked as satisfactory however this is limited to 20% of
its portfolio (Besley et al., 2010).
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Secondly, project evaluation is undertaken by the Evaluation Department within the EBRD
which selects projects on a sample basis and measures progress against set ex-ante targets.
The ex-ante benchmarks which are related to transition impact are set by project economists
(Besley  et  al.,  2010).  Furthermore,  project  evaluations  are  undertaken  both  ex-post  and
during the project life cycle. Finally, the OCE compiles country-wide Transition Indicators on
an annual basis and publishes them in a Transition Report.
The  Transition  Report  comprises  nine  indicators  across  four  areas:  privatisation  and
restructuring  (3  indicators),  markets  and  trade  (3  indicators),  financial  institutions  (2
indicators) and infrastructure (one indicator) (Besley et al., 2010). Each area is assessed on a
scale of 1 to 4+ with 1 indicating transition which has not yet commenced and 4+ complete
transition.  Whilst  transition  indicators  are  widely  used  externally  they  do  not  have  any
operational link within the bank, and this is a significant weakness. That said, it has been
argued by Besley et al., (2010) that the dissonance between transition indicators and project
related  transition  indicators  is  strong  counterargument  for  establishing  the  bank.  This
argument  points  towards  the  healthy  debate  elicited  by  development  impact  measuring
leading  to  better  results  and  more  accountability.  In  light  of  this,  a  review  of  the  broad
outcomes measured by DFIs follows:
2.11 A Review of The Generic Outcomes Measured by DFIs
Employment generation
Runde (2016) notes that most DFIs report on direct and indirect jobs which are supported by
their  investments.  This  is  because  employment  creation  is  considered  important  as  a
contributor towards poverty alleviation (Bracking & Ganho, 2011). Consequently, this metric is
universal amongst DFIs. Stimulating economic development through job provision lies at the
heart of PSD (Lemma, 2015). Measuring employment generated is relatively easy provided
DFI clients are compelled to disclose the information. However, critics of this metric argue that
it  often  fails  to  measure  displacement  effects  (Lemma, 2015).  Furthermore,  the  metric  is
based on the weak assumption that increases in employment can be attributed to investments
made whereas this could be a result of other factors (Bracking & Ganho, 2011).
37
Government/ tax revenues
Under  this  metric,  government  revenue from DFI  funded clients  or  projects  is  measured
(Runde, 2016). The argument is that increases in government revenue have a positive effect
on economic development. With more revenues, increased spending can then go towards
infrastructure, healthcare and education. This metric has been criticised for being an absolute
number as opposed to being a relative measure—gross tax paid does not indicate whether
the tax paid is a fair share  (Bracking & Ganho, 2011). Additionally, this measure attributes
taxes paid to investments which might not be the case.
Investment outcomes
This metric is concerned with the rate of return from a project including for other enterprises
supported by the DFI  (Runde, 2016). DFIs seek a financial return on their investments to
ensure  sustainability.  However,  measuring  investment  outcomes  has  been  criticised  for
crowding out other equally important non-financial  measures. Moreover, it is insensitive to
environmental harm (Bracking, 2012).
Environmental and social outcomes
The focus of this metric is on improvements to the environment against set targets. In some
instances it  considers the availability  of  an environmental  management system  (Bracking,
2012). It has been criticised for failing to incorporate international standards on environmental
care.  Furthermore,  it  has been argued by Bracking  (2012) that  environmental  factors are
subordinate to financial factors when DFIs make investment decisions.
Catalysing and mobilisation
This metric assesses the amount of funds injected by other investors as a result of the initial
DFI investment (Runde, 2016). DFIs mobilise resources through demonstration effects even
though  this  is  hard  to  measure.  Thus,  proving  causality  of  additional  resources  from
demonstration is complicated.
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2.12 Conclusion
This dissertation’s literature review has commenced from a general overview of development
finance  and  DFIs.  The  distinguishing  feature  of  development  finance  is  its  emphasis  on
creating positive developmental impact  (Lemma, 2015). Subsequently, a review of DFIs in
general was undertaken. Key themes on what DFIs strive to achieve were deciphered from
literature  including  the  theoretical  assumptions  that  have  motivated  their  growth  and
popularity. In sum, the assumption has been that provision of finance results in economic
development.  Counterarguments  against  this  claim  were  reviewed.  Distilling  further,  the
review focused on DFIs in South Africa. The close relationship between the involvement of
the  state  and  DFI  architecture  was  explored  commencing  from  a  political  economy
perspective. The overbearing theme is a positive relationship between DFI mandates and
politics.
The financialisation of the South African economy was reviewed briefly for two reasons: firstly,
finance plays a significant  role  in  the economy and the role  played by DFIs  in  providing
finance capital. The review then explored in detail PSD in South Africa—a concept which lies
at the core of DFI activities. Key arguments in favour of and against this intervention were
explored.  The  PSD  discussion  set  the  scene  for  an  exploration  of  development  impact
evaluation systems beyond which the most popular systems were evaluated. An analysis of
the main metrics used to measure development impact then followed. Overall, the literature
review  has  illuminated  a  theoretical  gap  which  exists  in  development  impact  evaluation
systems in South Africa. Evidently, there are no formal studies incorporating South African
nuances.  Northern  firms  have  made  great  strides  in  this  area.  Perhaps  this  study  will
contribute towards making this subject more mainstream in South Africa. Therefore, the stage
has been set for a qualitative inductive study to answer the research questions.
2.13 Conceptual Framework
The issue  of  South  African  DFI  development  impact  has  been problematised by  various
authors.  Qobo  and  Motsamai  (2014) illuminated  the  lack  of  objective  criteria  by  DFIs  to
evaluate developmental outcomes. A review of DFIs by the National Treasury made two major
findings.  Firstly,  the  lack  of  a  consistent  and  standardised  framework  for  assessing
performance.  Such  framework  the  review  argued,  must  consider  economic  efficiency,
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development effectiveness and financial sustainability. Secondly, the strong inability of DFIs to
effectively  measure  the  impact  of  their  activities.  This  was  attributed  to  performance
monitoring systems  (Julies,  2017).  The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the
debate on DFI effectiveness by studying development impact evaluation systems.
At  a  broad  theoretical  level,  this  dissertation  is  situated  in  the  literature  on  the  political
economy of development finance. Bracking  (2009) offers a counter-narrative to mainstream
understanding  of  government  aid  through  development  finance,  usually  portrayed  as  a
benevolent act of charity. Rather, development finance can be viewed as ‘a profitable industry
fixed in its own political economy’ (Bracking, 2009, p. xiii). Furthermore, it is argued that the
financialisation of the South African economy underpins DFI interventions and the subsequent
selection  of  impact  evaluation  methodologies  and  indicators.  Therefore,  an  emerging
argument is that DFIs do not necessarily finance development but rather develop finance.
This study is based on two theoretical constructs established in literature. The first theme is
that all DFIs can be classified into one of two groups. These are, apartheid-era established
DFIs and post-apartheid-era established DFIs. Subsequently,  they can be grouped further
according to their PFMA listing. Figure 6 depicts the DFIs according to this classification.
Such classification is necessary given the absence of testable theory on South African DFI
impact evaluation systems. The intention is to gain an understanding of how South African
DFIs measure the impact of their investments. Mapping them is essential for theory building.
The  relationship  depicted  in  Figure  6  represents  the  political  economy  and  regulatory
environment under which DFIs must establish their impact evaluation systems. On the vertical
axis is the political environment. The political environment sets the mandates of the DFI. The
mandate determines outcomes of interests. In addition, the horizontal axis outlines the PFMA
classification of the DFI. For this study, two extremes have been selected, namely, Schedule
3A - National public entities and Schedule 2 - Major public entities. Because Schedule 2 -
Major public entities command more assets, it is expected that they will have matured impact
evaluation systems relative to Schedule 3A - National public entities. The PFMA classification
has a bearing on regulatory reporting requirements including impact evaluation. Stemming
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from this, the dissertation seeks to gain an understanding of the factors that influence DFI
decision making as well as the assumptions they make on development impact evaluation
systems.
Selected cases fall into different quadrants on the plot. The Land Bank, IDC and DBSA were
established in the apartheid era and are also listed as Schedule 2 - Major public entities. For
this reason they occupy the same quadrant.  sefa, a subsidiary of the IDC, was established
post-apartheid  thus  it  occupies  its  own  quadrant.  Finally,  the  NEF  and  NHFC  were
established post-apartheid and listed as Schedule 3A - National public entities.
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Figure 6: Cases Classified by Establishment Era and PFMA Listing
Post-apartheid 
era 
established 
DFIs
Apartheid era 
established 
DFIs
Schedule 3A 
National public 
entity
Schedule 2 
Major public 
entity
N/A-no national DFIs in this quadrant
Development Bank of South Africa
Land Bank
Industrial Development Corporation
National Empowerment Fund
National Housing Finance Corporation Small Enterprise Finance Agency
3 Background Context of Each Case
The Land Bank, the IDC and the DBSA are South Arica’s largest DFIs, holding up to 90% of
DFI assets (Julies, 2017). These three major DFIs were established during South Africa’s pre-
democracy era. In contemporary post-colonial  and post-apartheid times, the South African
Government established up to nine DFIs. These DFIs, like their pre-democracy predecessors
were set out in line with the politics of the era; this time to confront a distinct set of problems
chief of which were the participation of the majority blacks in the economy, access to decent
housing,  job  creation  and financial  inclusion.  These objectives  have  been translated  into
mandates of the DFIs as summarised in Table 1.
Figure 2 shows that the objectives of South African DFIs are closely related to the country’s
historical epochs. Because of this, DFI objectives have mutated and been transformed in line
with the political forces at play during an era. Such mutation and transformation is consistent
with  Bracking’s  (2009) characterisation  of  post-colonialism.  Like  post-colonialism,  post-
apartheid involves a state-sponsored development system which is constantly reinvented to
attain political goals. Such system has produced black elites who are highly financialised and
dependent upon the state (Ashman et al., 2011).
Therefore, the nature and form of economic development produced by DFIs is closely related
to political  realities of the day. To exemplify, colonial and apartheid governments of South
Africa  used  DFIs  to  promote  racially  segregated  development  whereas  the  democratic
government has attempted to use DFIs for redistribution and inclusion  (Qobo & Motsamai,
2014). In view of this, the evaluation of development impact evaluation systems is salient
because  DFI  activities  are  often  subjected  to  political  interference.  To  what  extent  does
politics influence measurement metrics and perceptions of success and failure? This question
is explored by reviewing the Land Bank, the IDC and the DBSA in detail  in the following
sections. After this, a brief background of the post-apartheid DFIs namely, sefa, the NEF and
the NHFC follows.
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The Land Bank
During  the  period  preceding  South  Africa’s  democracy  in  1994,  economic  affairs  were
organised along racial lines, especially to benefit whites. As a result, the agricultural sector
was  structured  in  a  way  that  benefited  white  commercial  farmers  (Ducastel  &  Anseeuw,
2018).  One of the state-controlled institutional  architectures to achieve this was the Land
Bank.  The  Land  Bank  was  set  up  in  1912  to  provide  loans  to  white  farmers  and  their
cooperatives. Such arrangement was necessary because whites were the main actors in the
commercial farming sector. Blacks had been relegated to the provision of cheap labour in the
bustling mining sector (Ducastel & Anseeuw, 2018). Thus, the Land Bank played an integral
part in developing both the agricultural and economic sector of South Africa. To achieve this,
the bank provided  – amongst other services  – government subsidies to white commercial
farmers and consolidated their debts during the economic turmoil of the 1930s.
When  the  National  Party  came  into  power  in  1948,  this  institutional  arrangement  of
channeling  funds to  white  commercial  farmers  through  the  Land Bank was  retained  and
bolstered  (Ducastel & Anseeuw, 2018). By the 1980s, three distinct objectives of the South
African Government centred around the Land Bank had emerged, namely: achievement of
agricultural self-sufficiency, maintenance of low food prices—especially for the mines and the
maintenance of the domination of white commercial farmers in the agricultural sector.
A series of significant events occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly, the
deregulation of financial markets and abolishment of apartheid. Following this, the Land Bank
was stripped of its fiscal and financial privileges and forced to compete with other financial
institutions  (Ducastel  &  Anseeuw,  2018).  This  change  confirms  a  mutation  of  objectives
inspired by the political forces of the day. Similarly, in the 1990s, the mandate of the bank took
a radical shift from the past towards supporting and funding emerging black farmers. This was
in  support  of  the  country’s  land  reform  policy.  Again,  this  reflected  the  politics  of  the
democratic era which sought to redress past injustices. However, the bank was implicated in
corruption  scandals.  In  addition,  the  land  reform  programme  was  generally  a  failure
engendering  another  restructuring  exercise  towards  more  profitable  activities  (Ducastel  &
Anseeuw, 2018). A similar trend can be observed in the industrial sector.
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The IDC
The IDC is South Africa’s DFI responsible for industrial promotion. It was established in 1940
by two Afrikaner intellectuals to address the ‘poor white’ problem through industrialisation, not
least through the exploitation of cheap black labour (Mondi & Bardien, n.d.). The argument at
the time was that industrialisation would entail import substitution and consequent reduction
of unemployment. The establishment of the IDC coincided with the commencement of the
Second World War. South Africa was implicated immediately in the war since it was under
British  dominion  (Mondi  &  Bardien,  n.d.).  In  order  to  support  the  war  efforts,  the  IDC’s
mandate was changed in 1942 to enable it to establish any business. Henceforth, the South
African Government had used the corporation to finance large-scale developmental projects
in  areas  such  as  textiles,  petrochemicals  and  mineral  beneficiation.  These  industries
supported its developmental and political aspirations.
Other  IDC-established  industries  were  the  South  African  Coal,  Oil  and  Gas  Corporation
(SASOL) and the Phosphate Development Corporation (Foskor). SASOL produced oil  and
Foskor, fertiliser. Both commodities were at risk of supply disruptions because of international
outrage over the National Party Government policy of apartheid (Mondi & Bardien, n.d.). Once
again, the use of a DFI to achieve political goals is evident.
During the 1980s, political and economic events had deteriorated in South Africa. There was
significant  internal  and  external  pressure  on  the  South  African  government  to  abolish
apartheid. Despite this, the IDC’s operations increased which evidenced the state’s hand in
influencing economic activity through the corporation  (Mondi & Bardien, n.d.). Following the
demise of apartheid in 1994, the IDC’s mandate metamorphosed once more. This time in
tandem with the democratic government’s neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) policy. At this stage, the IDC was called upon to support industrial development to
improve the  competitiveness of  exports  and attract  foreign  investment  (Mondi  & Bardien,
n.d.).
Mondi  and Bardien  (n.d.)  further  argue that  the  IDC has been and continues to  be  an
instrument of the state to effect industrial financing and the development of strategic national
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projects. Furthermore, they argue that the IDC remains deeply implicated in political economy
as determined by the state. To exemplify, there was a shift in the mandate of the IDC from
establishing light manufacturing industries capable of exploiting cheap black labour towards
capital-intensive  industries  following the  transition  from apartheid  to  democracy  (Mondi  &
Bardien, n.d.).
The DBSA
The DBSA owes its existence to South Africa’s apartheid era Prime Minister, PW Botha. The
idea then was to achieve two objectives: on the one hand the bank would fund development
in the homelands and on the other it was a basis for the establishment of an apartheid style
union of Southern African states (DBSA, 2010). At the time of its establishment, in 1983, the
DBSA comprised  South  Africa  and  the  four  ostensibly  independent  homelands,  Transkei,
Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei (ActionAid South Africa, 2013).
Given this background, and according to DBSA (2010, p. 13) the institution “was set up as
part of a political strategy aimed at strengthening the ‘homelands’, which the apartheid regime
created under its separate development policies”. Therefore, the DBSA has not been immune
to transformation and mutation like the other DFIs discussed earlier in this dissertation. This
reflects the nexus between politics and economics consonant with Stiglitz’s (2013) argument
that politics and economics are related and have a reinforcing relationship.
Following democratic elections in 1994, the bank was considered a key partner in supporting
government  interventions  and  priorities  under  the  Reconstruction  and  Development
Programme (RDP) and later the IMF and World Bank prescribed GEAR  (ActionAid South
Africa, 2013). To support these interventions, a transformation team was appointed by the
Minister  of  Finance at  the end of  1994 to  work  with  relevant  stakeholders  in  crafting an
appropriate role for the bank consistent with the new political era. By 1997, through an act of
parliament  the  bank’s  mandate  was  changed  to  focus  on  funding  public  infrastructure
(ActionAid South Africa, 2013).
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The bank’s 20th anniversary came in 2003, at which point the bank’s role had changed to
become  a  financier,  advisor  and  partner  with  a  vision  to  promote  regional  integration,
eliminate poverty, inequality and dependency. Today, according to DBSA (2017, p. 6), the
bank  has  a  vision  to  promote  ‘a  prosperous  and  integrated  resource-efficient  region,
progressively  free  of  poverty  and dependency’.  Despite  being  generally  autonomous,  the
bank  remains  deeply  entrenched  into  the  political,  social  and  economic  priorities  of  the
government of the day (ActionAid South Africa, 2013). What follows is a brief outline of the
post-apartheid DFIs forming part of this study.
The NHFC
The NHFC is a state-owned DFI whose mandate is to make housing finance affordable and
accessible to individuals and households with monthly incomes between R1500 and R5000
(National Housing Finance Corporation Soc LTD, 2017). In other words, it seeks the inclusion
of lower income groups in the property finance market. To achieve its mandate the company
undertakes  five  main  initiatives:  Social  housing,  privately  owned  rental  housing,  home
ownership,  incremental  housing  and strategic  partnerships  to  leverage private-sector  and
development finance to create affordable housing.
The sefa
According to Small Enterprise Finance Agency (2017),  sefa is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the  IDC  mandated  to  foster  the  establishment,  survival  and  growth  of  SMMEs  and  co-
operatives.  Through  this  mandate,  sefa  contributes  towards  job  creation  and  poverty
alleviation.
The NEF
The NEF is South Africa’s National DFI mandated to grow B-BBEE through the provision of
funding and other support services. Key market failures which the DFI seeks to address are:
access  to  finance,  access  to  markets  and  increasing  the  management  depth  of  black
business people (National Empowerment Fund, 2016).
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4 Methodology
Research Approach, Paradigm and Strategy
A qualitative research approach was adopted because the objective of the study was to build
theory on how South African DFIs measure the impact of their investments. This had been
identified as an area for further study in the literature review. From an epistemological point,
this dissertation assumed that how South African DFIs measure their impact and the tools
they use are subjective, contextual and most importantly, shaped by politics. Because of this,
a qualitative research design was appropriate (Leacock, Rose, & Warrican, 2009).
The nature of the research questions in the dissertation also warranted a qualitative study.
The  research  questions  are  focused  on  the  “how”  and  “why”  of  development  impact
evaluation  (Maxwell, 2008). Moreover, the aim of the study was to gain an insight into the
characteristics and phenomena of development impact evaluation systems in their current
state. Such an approach is consistent with qualitative research methodology as propounded
by Jonker and Pennink (2010).
A qualitative study has the benefit of availing a diverse range of procedural, methodical and
instrumental possibilities which makes it easier to relate the approach to the phenomena in
the  subject  of  study  (Jonker  & Pennink,  2010).  That  said,  qualitative  research has been
criticised  for  commencing  with  open  questions  thus  making  the  researcher  work  with
uncertainty. Before looking at the research strategy it is important to spell out the research
paradigm of the dissertation.
A research paradigm, ‘refers to a set of very general philosophical assumptions about the
nature of the world (ontology) and how we can understand it (epistemology)’ (Maxwell, 2008,
p. 224). A qualitative research approach comprises different paradigms such as interpretivism,
critical theory, feminism, postmodernism, grounded theory and phenomenology. In light of the
researcher’s  assumptions  about  the  world,  choice  of  research  topic  and  the  research
questions,  a  grounded  theory  paradigmatic  stance  was  undertaken.  This  leads  to  the
research strategy.
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The research strategy used was the comparative case study approach.  According to  Yin
(2003), case studies are an appropriate strategy when the research questions seek to answer
questions  on  the  “how”  and  the  “why”  of  current  events.  Accordingly,  the  main  research
question  of  this  dissertation  was  concerned  with  how  DFIs  measure  the  impact  of  their
investments.  Additionally,  the  sub-questions  were  concerned  with  how  impact  evaluation
systems influence current and future decisions. This made the case study approach fit for
purpose.
Multiple cases were used to develop theory on South African DFI impact evaluation systems
inductively. An advantage of multiple cases is that they provide replication logic in support of
the emerging theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Furthermore, theory building from cases
is akin to mathematical analysis because of its disciplinary effect on researchers. It forces
researchers to  adhere to data in their  analytical  models.  For  this  reason, the case study
approach was appropriate.  (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) Finally, Eisenhardt and Graeber
(2007,p 25) argue that case studies are the best ‘bridges from rich qualitative evidence to
mainstream  deductive  research’.  However,  a  challenge  that  is  often  experienced  when
applying the case study approach for theory building is sample selection.
Sampling Approach
When  choosing  which  cases  to  focus  on  in  answering  the  three  research  questions,  a
theoretical sampling approach was followed. This is because the purpose of the study was to
build theory and not to test it. Theoretical sampling refers to an approach of selecting cases
based on their richness in theoretical insight  (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Consequently,
the landscape of South African DFIs was delineated into two broad categories to inform the
selection of cases. These categories were explored in detail  in the conceptual  framework
section of this dissertation. On the one extreme are the DFIs established during the apartheid
era and on the other are those established in the post-apartheid era. Based on this,  this
research selected the IDC, Land Bank, DBSA, NEF, NHFC and sefa as indicated in Figure 6.
These multiple cases were used for data collection because they provided a robust basis for
theory building. Furthermore, they enabled a broader exploration of the research questions
49
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Finally, generalisation, comparability and accuracy of theory
was enhanced by the multiple cases. This improved validity of the research.
The apartheid era DFIs (IDC, Land Bank and DBSA) were explored in detail in section 2.13 of
this study. These DFIs hold approximately 90% of all the assets held by DFIs (Julies, 2017).
Because of their size and historical background, they form important bastions of information
on  DFI  development  impact  evaluation  systems.  Therefore,  theoretically  they  contained
relevant information related to this study and resulted in deepened theory emerging. Though
coverage was irrelevant in this study, it is noteworthy that selected cases covered much of the
landscape of South African DFIs. Moreover, these cases were augmented by 3 more cases
comprising of two Schedule 3A National public entities (NHFC and NEF) and one major public
entity (sefa). These entities were established in the post-apartheid era. Thus, once data had
been collected from these organisations an argument for generalisation was made.
Interview respondents from the selected cases were chosen based on one of three criteria:
whether  they worked in  the monitoring  and evaluation  department,  whether  they were  in
middle-level to senior-level management and whether they were involved in loan origination
and monitoring. Table 6 lists the interview respondents of the study.
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Respondent Reference Organisation RQDA File Code Position
DBSA Respondent 2 DBSA G Head:  Operations  and
Evaluation Unit
DBSA Respondent 1 DBSA I Credit  Analyst-  Project
Finance
Land Bank Respondent 1 Land Bank C GM:  Research  and
Intelligence
IDC Respondent 1 IDC D Senior Regional Officer
IDC Respondent 2 IDC F Senior  Manager:  Corporate
Strategy
sefa Respondent 1 sefa H Investment Analyst
sefa Respondent 2 sefa J Investment Analyst
NEF Respondent 1 NEF A Post-Investment Manager
NHFC Respondent 1 NHFC E Business  Development
Manager
NHFC Respondent 2 NHFC B General  Manager:  Lending
Division
Table 6: Interview Respondents
The objective was to gain accurate data on how the selected DFI measures the impact of its
investments,  how  impact  evaluation  results  affect  current  and  future  decisions  and  the
relevancy of  the system in  affecting DFI  behaviour.  The credentials  of  respondents  were
heterogeneous because selected DFIs operate differently. Some DFIs have dedicated impact
evaluation  departments  whilst  others  incorporate  the  function  into  other  business  units.
Overall, a respondent was only selected if they had been with the DFI for at least one year.
Data collection
Case  studies  embrace  data  collection  using  a  variety  of  methods  such  as  interviews,
questionnaires, observations, survey data and ethnographies  (Yin, 2003).  This study used
both  primary  and  secondary  data.  Primary  data  was  collected  through  a  semi-structured
interview guide (See Appendix 1). Interviews have the benefit of providing key insights into a
phenomenon under the study as well as pointing towards other sources of data. Despite this,
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they suffer from poor recall and inaccurate or poor articulation (Yin, 2003). A semi-structured
interviewing  approach  safeguarded  against  the  weaknesses  of  standardised  interviews
(Prevos, 2016).
Therefore, to answer the main research question, respondents were asked questions on who
does impact evaluation, when impact evaluation is done and how impact evaluation is done. A
prime  question  was  the  meaning  ascribed  to  development  impact  in  the  DFI.  This  was
relevant because development impact means different things to different people. Following
this, an investigation of the development impact evaluation systems in use was undertaken.
Key  questions  in  this  pillar  were  focused  on  the  elements  of  environmental,  social  and
governance factors measured. On the timing of evaluation, questions probed ex-ante and ex-
post evaluations. Furthermore, it was asked what formal impact evaluation role the DFI owner
had before and after investments are made. The intention was to establish the relationship
between the tools and their effect on decision-making. The result was a narrative account of
the various systems in use, their similarities and differences with global standards as well as
their supposed strengths and weaknesses.
The  first  research  sub-question  probed  the  credibility  and  relevancy  of  the  information
provided by the system in use. To do this, questions focused on the frequency of evaluations,
frequency of  development  impact  reporting,  development  verification  processes,  timing of
reports and the publication of reports. This led to the second sub-question.
Research  sub-question  2  focused  on  whether  the  impact  evaluation  systems  support
evidence-based decision making and learning. To answer it, questions were asked whether
there had been instances of investments being rejected on account of development impact
weakness,  whether  post-investment  impact  assessments  affected  future  decisions  and
whether  there  was  a  systematic  way  of  managing  post-investment  impact  evaluation
feedback.
Interviews  were  face  to  face,  telephonically  and  using  telecommunications  application
software such as Skype, Zoom and WhatsApp. Interviews were recorded electronically with
consent from the respondents. After this, they were transcribed by a third party and checked
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for  accuracy  by  the  researcher.  Interview transcripts  (textual)  were  uploaded  into  RQDA
software for further analysis and storage. 
Because of the weaknesses of interviews articulated earlier, secondary data to corroborate
interviews was also collected. This was done by examining publicly available information such
as published Annual Reports, policy documents and reviewing organisational websites. This
helped  in  achieving  triangulation  and  safeguarding  against  research  validity  threats.  In
examining secondary sources, emphasis was placed on the quality of the publicly available
development impact information (Bracking & Ganho, 2011). 
Data analysis
Approach to analysing interview data
A Grounded Theory approach was used for analysing interview transcripts similar to what
Prevos  (2016) adopted  in  his  study.  Grounded  Theory  applies  a  general  method  of
comparative analysis. It is a qualitative research paradigm popularised by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) in their seminal work. According to the authors, Grounded Theory refers to the process
of discovering theory from data systematically obtained from social research. From their work,
emerged two schools of thought on Grounded Theory: the positivist Glaserian approach and
the interpretive Straussian approach (Prevos, 2016). The two approaches will be discussed in
turn.
Glaser’s version of Grounded Theory is mainly positivist; it emphasises the neutrality of data
from  which  theory  emerges,  researcher  objectivity  and  variable  analysis  (Charmaz  &
Henwood,  2011).  In  contrast,  the  Straussian  approach  is  constructivist—this  implies  that
“theories are not found ready made in reality, but must be constructed” (Strauss & Corbin) as
cited by  (Prevos, 2016, p. 59) . A constructivist grounded theory is circumstantial, temporal
and spatial. What follows from this, is a priori coding to process interview data by referring to
reviewed literature and existing theory (Prevos, 2016). 
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This  dissertation  follows  the  constructivist  approach  to  data  analysis.  Such  an  approach
entails a three-phased coding technique (open, theoretical and selective coding) as illustrated
in Figure 7. A constructivist approach was selected because it is not possible to study DFI
development  impact  evaluation  systems  objectively.  This  stems  from  their  historical
background and their changing landscape. Additionally, in entering the field, the researcher’s
ideas were shaped by applicable literature and other publicly available information.
Figure 7: Grounded Theory Research Process
Source: (Fernández, 2004)
The mechanics of Qualitative Data Analysis
In analysing interview transcripts, the researcher used the RQDA software package. RQDA is
an R package for Qualitative Data Analysis which provides tools for textual  data analysis
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(Huang, 2016). R is a freely available computer programming language which is mainly used
for statistical and graphical research techniques (R Core Team, 2018). The work by Prevos
(2016) is seminal in the field of qualitative data science. His approach for analysing interview
data using RQDA which follows the process propounded by  Fernández (2004) in  Figure 7
was followed in this study.
As discussed earlier, what follows from this process is a three-phase coding process. Firstly,
open coding of the transcripts was carried out by referring to literature, interview questions
and emerging constructs. At this stage, focus was on individual cases. After this, transcripts
were reviewed to check whether codes had been correctly assigned in addition to checking
the  data  for  theoretical  saturation.  Secondly,  at  the  theoretical  coding  level,  codes  were
summarised into a thematic plot highlighting the occurrence of themes across the various
interviews (See  fig  11  Appendix  2).  This  plot  does  not  necessarily  show  the  logical
relationships between the identified topics  (Prevos, 2016). What follows from the plot is an
assessment of causal mechanisms emerging from the cases. 
Finally, selective coding was done, which entails the identification of core categories and the
development of a theory based on the categories. The core categories of this study were the
basis  of  the  thematic  areas  of  the  interview  guide.  The  emergent  theory  looked  at  the
outcomes of  the study in  relation to  international  DFIs as explored in literature.  Figure 8
shows the main topics explored during the interviews.
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Figure 8: Interview Topics Word Cloud
Once interview data and secondary data had been analysed, the study classified the broad
research findings as follows:  In  the first  part,  case descriptions of the main development
impact evaluation systems used by firms in the sample was done. Secondly, an argument
following  theoretical  propositions  was  built  from the  cases  to  answer  the  main  research
question. Lastly, the argument was that the two sub-questions are mainly concerned about
the effectiveness of the tools used by South African DFIs. Accordingly, an evaluation of impact
measurement indicators in use was undertaken.
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5 Research Findings, Analysis and Discussion
5.1 Research Findings
To answer the research questions, the researcher interviewed 10 staff members from 6 DFIs.
In  addition,  the  researcher  reviewed  published  annual  reports  of  the  selected  DFIs.  In
Appendix  1  is  the  interview  guide  which  was  used  during  the  discussions.  Appendix  6
summarises the themes and supporting quotes from the interviews. The following section is a
discussion of the findings related to the overarching research question. 
The point of departure was how South African DFIs measure the impact of their investments.
As a precursor, the researcher noted that development impact means different things to each
of the DFIs. A distinguishing feature being the DFI mandate. Nonetheless, common motifs of
development impact were identified in both pre- and post-apartheid-established DFIs. From
this,  a  definition  of  development  impact  unique  to  South  African  DFIs  emerged.  Thus,
development impact refers to the positive effect of finance capital investments by DFIs on
social transformation, job creation and well-being. Social transformation is characterised by
women’s participation in the economy, decent housing, black economic empowerment, rural
economic emancipation and youth empowerment.  Impact evaluation systems in place are
purposed to measure changes to social transformation, employment levels and well-being. 
Distinct impact evaluation systems are used by each of the 6 DFIs that participated in this
research. An exception is the NHFC which does not necessarily have a development impact
evaluation system. This was confirmed by one of the interview respondents who had this to
say:
I tried to explain that in my e-mail that our research unit was responsible for that, and  
that research unit was closed down the last time we did restructuring, which was like 
about five years ago (NHFC, Respondent 1).
What  follows  in  Figure  9  is  a  schematic  view  of the  systems  in  place  identified  from
transcribed interviews. The diagram was generated by RQDA.
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Figure 9: Development Impact Evaluation Systems
The individual systems are discussed in detail in the following sections:
Empowerment Dividend
The NEF uses the  Empowerment  Dividend to  measure  the  impact  of  its  investments.  In
addition  to  investment  return,  this  measure  evaluates  women  empowerment,  geographic
spread of the portfolio, jobs created/ supported and investment in priority growth sectors. NEF
then reports on how it maximised the empowerment dividend in its annual report. Targets are
set and reported on for investments in black empowered businesses, employment creation,
support for black women’s economic participation and investments across all South African
provinces. 
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Development Results Reporting System
The  Development  Results  Reporting  System is  a  DBSA designed  system for  measuring
developmental  results.  The  system has  a  set  of  indicators  and  templates  for  measuring
development results. DBSA focuses on development results instead of development impact.
According to the interview respondents, such focus gives them a much broader aspect to look
at and report on. Likewise, the DFI’s annual report presents data on outputs and development
outcomes. The outputs are split into project preparation and infrastructure financing. Output
indicators focus on total  projects approved for funding, total  funding mobilised for project
preparation cost, total approvals, total disbursements, total commitments, total disbursements
to the rest of SADC and disbursements to municipalities in South Africa (Development Bank
of Southern Africa, 2017).
However, it is from the infrastructure financing that development outcomes are expected and
reported on. Outcomes of infrastructural financing are split and reported on in two clusters,
namely,  anticipated  development  impact  and  actual  development  impact.  The  following
examples  of  outcome  indicators  are  reported  on:  Energy-total  number  of  households
impacted,  Rehabilitation  of  roads-total  households  impacted,  Water-total  households
impacted, and temporary job opportunities created  (Development Bank of Southern Africa,
2017).
SAP Program/ Developmental Scorecard
The IDC uses the SAP Program, an enterprise software package customised to meet its
needs. IDC personnel capture all the data about the project into the system. This includes,
personal information of the project sponsors, racial status, geographical area of investment,
shareholders and the directors of the investee. SAP then calculates a development impact
score. The highest development impact score is 5 and the lowest is 1.  Although a lot  of
investee data is collected, the only elements which contribute to development impact scoring
are black industrialist, the number of jobs expected, and the geographical area of investment.
In its annual report, the IDC reports development impact on the following indicators: value of
funding disbursed, total value of funding approved, funding to black industrialists, funding to
women-empowered businesses, funding to youth-empowered businesses, funding in support
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of government localisation initiatives and expected direct jobs created and saved (Industrial
Development Corporation, 2017). 
sefaLAS
The Small Enterprise Finance Agency uses a system called sefaLAS for development impact
evaluation.  sefaLAS collects data on the number of  jobs that  would be created, investee
ownership details: youth ownership, black ownership, geographic location of investment. After
this, it calculates the development impact. As a result, the DFI’s annual report outlines the
following indicators: jobs facilitated, funds disbursed to priority rural areas, funds disbursed to
youth-owned businesses, funds disbursed to women-owned businesses and the total number
of businesses financed (Small Enterprise Finance Agency, 2017).
Corporate Scorecard
The  Land  Bank  uses  the  Corporate  Scorecard  to  measure  its  development  impact.  The
scorecard defines a specific Key Performance Area (KPA) related to development impact.
This informs what is measured during a reporting period. The scorecard spells the weighting,
target, measures and quarterly performance (Land Bank, 2018). This was corroborated by the
Land  Bank  interview  respondent.  Development  impact  measures  the  transformation
component of  disbursed funds, that is,  to what extent funds have been allocated towards
black farmers, or emerging farmers, or new black farmers, or existing black farmers, or black
workers that want to be part of an employee farm ownership scheme .
Beyond systems, it is important to evaluate who does the impact evaluations. This matters
because it ascertains the value assigned to the process. Impact evaluations undertaken by an
independent  department  provide  useful  managerial  information.  The  same  is  true  of
evaluations by the apex decision making body in the DFI. The question to ask is whether
impact  evaluations  are  perfunctory  or  binding.  The  research  identified  three  groups  of
evaluators across the six cases which are discussed below:
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Investment Analysts
A recurring  theme  across  the  cases  is  that  impact  evaluations  are  done  by  Investment
Analysts.  They  do  this  as  part  of  deal  appraisal.  Because  all  the  DFIs  under  study  are
demand driven, they assess client proposals based on a number of factors. One of the factors
is  development  impact.  Investment  Analysts  are  mainly  concerned  with  the  potential
development impact of the project as part of the overall viability of the project. In some cases,
the investment analysts work with a team of social, environmental and technical experts for
this evaluation. 
Credit Committee
The researcher noted that the Credit Committee reviews the work of Investment Analysts. In
all cases, the Credit Committee signs off a deal as worth investing based on financial and
developmental  viability.  There was no evidence of separate development impact  sign-offs
prior  to  investment.  Even in  cases with  separate  monitoring  departments,  the  investment
decision lies with the Credit Committee.
Post-investment Monitoring
All the DFIs under study said that they have a process of post-investment portfolio monitoring.
The main objective being to ensure compliance with loan covenants including those related to
development impact.  To increase development impact,  the NEF has other interventions in
place such as a mentorship programme, technical assistance and other non-financial support.
Similarly, the NHFC runs an incubation programme to support black women and the youth to
participate in the property market. 
A  key  determinant  of  the  effectiveness  of  impact  evaluations  is  their  timing.  All  the
interviewees in this study indicated that there is an ex-ante assessment or appraisal. Thus,
prior to making any investment the potential developmental benefits and targets of the project
are assessed as part of the screening process. In addition, ex-post evaluations are done to
check performance against set targets and goals. Furthermore, a well-grounded principle of
effective impact  evaluation is  that  policy makers must  take an active role  in  the process
(Gertler et al., 2016). Because of this, interviewees were also asked about the development
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impact role assumed by DFI owners either before or after investments have been made. The
following observation was made:
South African National DFIs are owned by five main government departments: the National
Treasury, the Economic Development Department, the Department of Trade and Industry, the
Department  of  Small  Business Development  and the  Department  of  Human Settlements.
Each  DFI  has  a  board  of  directors  which  is  appointed  by  the  minister  of  the  relevant
department. The role of shareholding departments is to set targets including for development
impact. The DFIs in turn report on the targets on a periodic basis. Therefore, the owners have
no formal role in monitoring development impact. This duty is subordinated to the board of
directors. In the next section the outcomes of interest measured by the DFIs under study are
examined in detail.
South  African  DFIs  dwell  on  a  number  of  outcomes  of  interest  or  indicators.  Table  9
summarises the indicators which were identified from the cases under study. 
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DFI Name Development Impact Indicators/ Outcomes of interest
Land Bank (Case 1) 1.  Disbursement  of  lending  funds  to  support  transformation
through direct support of emerging farmers
2. Support to emerging farmers via intermediary lenders
3.  Lending  support  to  black-owned  corporate  agricultural
businesses
4. Direct investments in transformational businesses
IDC (Case 2) 1. Value of funding disbursed (R’ bn)
2. Total value of funding approved - with agreement signed (R’ bn)
3.  Funding  to  Black  Industrialists  -  value  of  funding  with  an
agreement signed (R’ bn)
4. Funding to women-empowered businesses - value of funding
with an agreement signed (R’ bn)
5. Funding to youth empowered businesses - value of funding with
an agreement signed (R’ bn)
6. Funding in support of government localisation initiatives - value
of funding with an agreement signed (R’ bn)
7.  Expected  direct  jobs  created  and  saved  -  at  signature  of
agreement (number)
DBSA (Case 3) 1. Value of funds under management
2. Value of infrastructure delivered
3. Schools completed
4. Schools in construction
5. Storm-damaged schools refurbished
6. Houses built
7. Health facilities completed
8. Storm-damaged clinics refurbished
9. Rural access roads completed
10. Municipal projects completed
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DFI Name Development Impact Indicators/ Outcomes of interest
sefa (Case 4) 1. Approvals
2. Disbursements
3. Businesses financed
4. Jobs facilitated ( jobs created and maintained )
NEF (Case 5) 1. Number of jobs expected to be supported or created
2. Percentage of portfolio owned by black women
3. Maintain/ increase percentage of portfolio by value invested in
the eight provinces outside Gauteng
4.  Investment  in  priority  growth  sectors as  identified  by  New
Growth Path (NGP) and the National Industrial Policy Framework
(NIPF) and Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP)
NHFC (Case 6) 1. Expand housing finance activities through the effective provision
of housing finance opportunities (disbursements)
2.  Facilitate  increased  and  sustained  lending  by  financial
institutions
3. Number of jobs facilitated
4.  Value of  disbursements  targeted towards  women,  youth  and
emerging B-BBEE entrepreneurs
Table 7: South African DFI Development Impact Measurement Indicators
A schematic  view  of  the  indicators  from  the  coded  interviews  which  corroborates  the
information in the table is shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Development Impact Indicators from Interviews
Prior to exploring the first sub-question, inquiry was made into the relationship between ex-
ante and ex-post assessment tools. It was found that across all the DFIs under study with the
exception  of  the  NHFC  there  are  pre-investment  and  post-investment  impact  evaluation
processes. At the pre-investment stage, targets are set, potential impact is scored, and the
investment appraised. After this, as part of the monitoring process, there is comparison of
actual impact against targets. This paved the way to the first sub-question.
Therefore,  with  reference  to  sub-question  one  on  the  provision  of  credible  and  timely
information,  the  researcher  found  that  evaluations  are  done  at  least  twice  for  each
investment. That is, pre-investment and post-investment. For the Land Bank, other ad hoc
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evaluations are done as part of World Bank funding requirements. This was confirmed by the
interview respondent as below:
I was telling you that on the one hand you have the World Bank that comes to 
basically  assess  the  development  impact  of  the  funding  (Land  Bank,  
Respondent 1). 
Public development impact reporting is done annually as part of the integrated annual report.
The  IDC,  DBSA,  Land  Bank  and  NHFC  prepare  their  annual  reports  in  line  with  the
International Integrated Reporting Framework (IR) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).
Both frameworks are global standards on sustainability reporting; though they offer limited
assurance.  It  was also noted that  the DFIs under  study report  progress on targets on a
quarterly basis to the shareholder.
None of the DFIs interviewed in this research are signatories of the Principles for Responsible
Investing (PRI). The PRI is the leading global advocate of responsible investing. It supports
investors in incorporating environmental,  social  and governance factors in investment and
ownership  decisions  (What  is  the  PRI?,  2019).  All  DFIs  take  development  impact  into
consideration  when evaluating  investment  decisions.  Furthermore,  development  impact  is
scored  in  some  way  by  combining  a  number  of  developmental  factors  related  to  an
investment. However, development impact is not necessarily at the centre of the investment
decision-making process. In all cases, financial viability takes precedence as shown in Figure
11.
In  relation  to  sub-question  two on whether  impact  evaluation  systems adopted by  South
African DFIs support  evidence-based decision making and learning, the following findings
emerged:  Firstly, South African National DFIs do not reject projects based on development
impact weakness. If a project is financially viable but weak on development impact it will be
approved.  In  such  instances,  DFIs  negotiate  with  their  clients  to  ‘raise  the  development
impact of the proposed project’. This sometimes takes adjustments to the financial model so
that it  is developmentally attractive. This is also supported by the prominence of financial
viability during the interviews as shown in Figure 11. Secondly, the research ascertained that
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post-investment assessments have a bearing on future decisions. But this is limited to lending
decisions and not development impact. There was no evidence of investments with weak
impact influencing future lending decisions. Credit Committees take into consideration past
information when approving loans in order to manage non-performing loans.
Finally, although interviewees noted the existence of post-investment monitoring departments,
there was no explicit indication of how data from this department feeds into the lending cycle.
A recurring theme was that they focus on loan repayment. It appeared that pre-investment
and  post-investment  were  focused  on  their  own  departmental  goals  with  no  reinforcing
development impact goal.
5.2 Research Analysis and Discussion
5.2.1 A Critique of Development Impact Measurement Indicators
Table 7 and Figure 10 establish a number of consistent South African DFI indicators, namely,
funds disbursed,  black ownership of  investee entity,  jobs created/  facilitated,  gender,  age
group, number of beneficiaries and value of infrastructure delivered. These indicators have a
close  relationship  with  what  is  measured  at  the  global  level.  However,  South  African
peculiarities  exist.  For  instance racial  development  indicators are  specific  to  South Africa
given  its  historical  account.  What  follows  is  a  critical  discussion  of  consistent  indicators
amongst the DFIs under study.
Funds disbursed
All the DFIs under this study report on funds disbursed as part of their development impact.
The causal influence for adopting this indicator is mandate fit. Every DFI is given funds by the
shareholder to meet its mandate. Moreover, all interviewees identified ‘mandate fit’ as the first
check during deal assessment. The emergent argument is that if funds are disbursed then the
DFI is meeting its mandate. As explored in literature, this indicator is based on the “financial
development” paradigm propounded by King and Levine 1993; Levine 1997 cited in Bonizzi
(2013).  However  with  the  negative  consequences of  heightened finance as  discussed  in
literature, South African DFIs must rethink this indicator.
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It is important to not only know more about the recipients but also whether the specific needs
of the recipients are being met. If development finance is to be effective, it must target specific
needy beneficiaries  and industries  in  line  with  the  national  policy  as  opposed to  making
disbursements to the most commercially viable opportunities. Additionally, there is a need to
recognise  that  excessive  finance  is  not  necessarily  good  for  the  economy  (Bezemer  &
Hudson, 2018). BNDES managed to achieve positive impacts by following such an approach
of  targeted funding  (Ferraz  & Coutinho,  2017).  Furthermore,  in  a  country  with  numerous
commercial  banks  it  is  unclear  if  the  funds  supplied  by  DFIs  crowd  in  private  sector
investments. This is because no counterfactual for this indicator is defined by South African
DFIs.
Black ownership of investee entities
In support  of  the transformation agenda all  the DFIs under study measure the volume of
investments made to black people. The democratic ANC government which owns all National
DFIs  has  been  and  continues  to  be  seized  with  the  transformation  question  as  part  of
redressing past injustices. In a country where racial segregation precluded the development
of black capitalism this indicator is of paramount importance. The downside is that focusing
on black economic empowerment has resulted in the formation of a state-sponsored small
financialised black elite (Ashman et al., 2011). Furthermore, empowerment transactions have
tended to involve the same people repeatedly.
Thus, it is insufficient to track investments in black companies without looking at qualitative
factors such as the role of black people in the business. Ashman et al., (2011) have noted that
blacks  are  sometimes  used  as  fronts  in  B-BBEE  deals  that  mostly  benefit  whites.  This
indicator  should  rather  refer  to  investments  into  black-owned  productive  businesses.
Productive businesses might be defined as entities promoting economic structural change.
This means moving away from narrow equity-based measures of economic empowerment
when evaluating development impact.
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Jobs created/ facilitated
All  the  cases  under  this  study  measure  their  impact  on  job  creation.  This  indicator  is
consistently measured by all DFIs globally and in South Africa. High quality jobs with good
pay  reduce  poverty,  inequality  and  improve  well-being.  Arguments  for  this  indicator  are
twofold, on the one hand is the role finance plays in expanding business operations resulting
in more people being hired. On the other, providing funds will help people generate their own
employment through entrepreneurship.
However, across all the DFIs under this study it is ambivalent how employment creation is
measured. Furthermore, qualitative aspects of job creation such as jobs benefiting the poor
and the displacement effects of new jobs are not measured or reported on. Moreover, this
indicator ignores a probable lack of causality between employment and poverty reduction.
This is significant because up to 35% of those employed in South Africa are living below the
poverty line (Sulla & Zikhali, 2018).
Gender
It is heuristically and academically sound that South African DFIs distinctly measure gender
effects of their investments. Gender alongside race and education is considered as one of the
key drivers of inequality in South Africa. According to Sulla and Zikhali (2018) female-headed
households have a 10% chance of slipping into poverty and a 2% less chance to escape
poverty  than  male-headed  households.  Furthermore,  women  fare  badly  on  employment
prospects- 37% of working age females are employed compared to 50% of men. Therefore,
targeting women for funding can increase development impact. Measuring gender effects of
investments is peculiar to South African DFIs. This indicator was recommended for European
DFIs by Bracking and Ganho (2011) in their study. A major weakness of this indicator is that it
does not account for elements of transformation.
Age Group
South African DFIs under this study measure the value of their funding to youth-empowered
businesses. South African youths suffer most from unemployment. In a report by Sulla and
Zikhali (2018), the rate of youth unemployment has been hovering around 50%. Furthermore,
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this age group has inadequate resources to undertake a job search and is often unable to
relocate for  distant  jobs. Therefore,  measuring investments to youth-owned enterprises is
supportive of development impact. However, the transformative impact of such a measure is
constrained if financial viability takes precedence over development impact. For instance, it is
unlikely that youths from poor backgrounds will have resources to put together a financially
viable proposal.  Therefore,  the indicator  must  be broadened to  include more background
information such as funded youths whose parents have no university education.
Number of Beneficiaries
The NEF, DBSA and NHFC measure the number of beneficiaries under their initiatives. This
indicator  assumes  a  positive  correlation  between  an  increase  in  DFI  beneficiaries  and
development impact. For instance, the NHFC assumes that if more units are built then more
people will benefit because they measure the number of beneficiaries per unit. As one of the
respondents said:
So we may define development impact in terms of, because another thing that we look
at – sorry, I did not mention this one – is not just the units we build but the housing 
beneficiaries who benefit. How many beneficiaries have benefited from the units that 
have been built is one of our performance indicators as well, and sometimes different 
organisations define  the  factors  that  calculate  the  beneficiaries  differently  (NHFC,  
Respondent 2).
This indicator is problematic because an increase in the number of beneficiaries does not
necessarily translate into transformation, particularly in a highly unequal society like South
Africa. Furthermore, such an indicator gives information on outputs as opposed to impact.
Moreover, there is an inconsistent process of calculating the number of beneficiaries across
DFIs as the NHFC respondent said:
We currently use the latest per-capita provided to us by Stats SA that there are 3.3 
beneficiaries  of  every  household.  So,  to  say  for  every  unit  that  is  built  3.3
beneficiaries benefit from that. Another organisation or another institution could define
it slightly differently which then poses a bit of a problem (NHFC, Respondent 2).
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Value of infrastructure delivered
The  DBSA is  South  Africa’s  DFI  charged  with  the  mandate  of  delivering  developmental
infrastructure in South Africa and the rest  of  the African continent.  The DBSA’s model  is
predominantly  project  finance  in  the  form  of  Public  Private  Partnerships  (PPPs).  The
developmental effects of infrastructure financing have been criticised. Part of the title of this
dissertation is based on the work by Hildyard  (2016) who argues that  development bank
financing  of  infrastructure  projects  is  much  about  developing  finance  and  not  financing
development.
Thus, measuring ‘value of infrastructure delivered’ as a development impact indicator must be
critically interrogated. Highly valued infrastructure might be delivered. However,  this might
only be accessible to an elite minority much to the detriment of the marginalised  (Hildyard,
2016).  Under  conditions  of  heightened  financialisation,  infrastructure  represents  an  asset
class  generating  returns  for  finance  and  less  as  a  service  to  communities.  As  a  result,
qualitative aspects of infrastructure financing must be considered as part of impact evaluation.
For  instance,  affordability  of  infrastructure,  provisioning and improved service delivery.  All
these factors are missing in the DBSA measure.
5.2.2 Impact Evaluation Systems or Monitoring?
The findings from this research reveal that all South African DFIs have a stipulated mandate
from their shareholder. DFIs are expected to deliver on wide-ranging developmental effects.
These include black economic empowerment, SMME development, affordable housing and
industrialisation.  To ensure mandate compliance,  the government  sets  some performance
targets. These targets are communicated through annual performance plans and shareholder
compacts. DFIs collect data on these targets and report to the shareholder. Therefore, South
African  development  impact  evaluation  systems  encompass  self-reporting  and  self-
assessment.  As a result,  the  systems have data  integrity  issues.  Not  surprisingly,  all  the
interview respondents questioned the integrity of the impact data.
A fundamental question is whether the tools and methodologies used by South African DFIs
to measure the impact of their investments can be described as impact evaluation systems or
monitoring? To answer this question, regard needs to be made first of the cardinal elements
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of  an impact  evaluation system. According to  White  (2009),  an impact  evaluation system
should be designed in such a way that there will be analytical rigour of the causal chain from
inputs  to  impacts.  The author  identifies six  key principles of  a  theoretically  sound impact
evaluation system: the ability to map out the causal chain, the ability to understand context,
the ability to anticipate heterogeneity,  the ability for  rigorous evaluation of  impact using a
credible counter-factual, the ability for rigorous factual analysis and that the system should
use mixed methods. Thus, the key to an evaluation is objective assessment of outcomes of
interest (Gertler et al., 2016).
Turning back to  the question of  whether  there are systems, or it  is  only monitoring,  it  is
evident from the data collected in this dissertation that the former prevails not least because
there  is  weak  complementarity  between  pre-  and  post-investment  assessment  tools.
Moreover, no evidence of conformance with the principles espoused by White  (2009) was
identified. As one respondent said:
Maybe just to clarify, in my experience, anyway, there is a difference between what is 
being  measured  and  what  is  being  asked  for  as  information.  The  stuff  which  I  
mentioned  to  you  is  mostly  being  asked  for,  for  information  purposes.  (IDC,  
Respondent 1)
In sum, across all  the cases, data is being collected for information and annual reporting.
There is no rigorous factual analysis or subjecting the data to comprehensive evaluation using
a credible counter-factual. Because of this, there is no systematic and objective assessment
of  the  development  impact  of  investments.  An emerging  conclusion  is  that  South  African
systems are ineffective.  This is exacerbated by the self-reporting nature of the tools in use.
Another important finding is the absence of independent impact evaluation departments.
5.2.3 Impact Evaluation Business Units
This study revealed that in most cases development impact evaluation is not the prerogative
of  separate independent business units.  In  their  study,  Bortes, Sinha,  and Grettve (2011)
identified independent evaluation departments as critical in the evaluation of DFI investments.
Thus,  the  lack  of  such  departments  in  South  African  DFIs  points  towards  weak  impact
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evaluation systems. The evaluation of project proposals for investment is within the ambit of
credit committees.
Credit committees assess development impact as part of the investment decision. Prior to
investment, no specific sign-off for development impact is done. In some cases (sefa and
IDC), development impact scores are used to determine the cost of finance. However, setting
interest  rates  in  relation  to  development  impact  might  be  an  incentive  for  inflating
developmental results at the time of performance reporting by investees. Suffice it to say that
credit committees are unlikely to be qualified to assess the development impact of projects
because their expertise is on loan repayment ability.
5.2.4 Owner Active Participation in Development Impact Evaluation
The  South  African  Government,  as  DFI  shareholder,  subordinates  the  duty  of  impact
monitoring and evaluation to governance structures. The researcher noted that in all cases
DFIs complied with the King III principles of good governance. The minister responsible for
the relevant DFI appoints a board of directors. The boards are structured along private sector
standards—in line with the neoliberal ideas of New Public Management. The board in turn
appoints  an  executive  team which  monitors  development  impact  amongst  other  strategic
responsibilities.
A major weakness of this approach to impact evaluation is that it relegates the role of the
owner to a distant interested party. Furthermore, it assumes that private-sector governance
structures produce optimum developmental results. In reality this might not be the case, as
one respondent put it:
And  then  if  obviously  like  all  other  boards  and  executives,  self-interest  and  self-
preservation  kick  in  and  you  would  want  to,  if  you  are  not  forced  to  report  on  
something and then not giving you specifics in terms of what they want your report to 
contain, so you would tend to report on the positive stuff (IDC, Respondent 1).
For this reason, it is imperative to recognise that private-sector-like governance structures are
not necessarily fit for development impact evaluation and monitoring. As explored in literature,
this is a structural and political economy issue which affects how DFIs can contribute towards
real transformation. Active shareholder participation is fundamental to organisational success.
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DFIs  must  thrive  to  provide  rigorous and transparent  information  on development  impact
including publications of independent external reviews of their operations (Bortes et al., 2011).
This  is  only  achievable  if  shareholders  demand it.  Hence,  the  active  participation  of  the
government as owner in impact evaluation is very important.
5.2.5 Focusing on Outputs and not Impact
Most  DFI  literature  on  impact  evaluations  recognises  that  a  key  weakness  of  the
measurement of  development impact in DFIs is that there is greater focus on outputs as
opposed to outcomes and impact (Bortes et al., 2011). Lemma (2015) makes the same point
and argues that DFIs struggle to articulate their impact on poverty reduction. The findings of
this  study support  these views particularly  because from a South African perspective,  no
measures on poverty reduction and inequality are being looked at. One respondent confirmed
this view and said:
We do not always look at impact specifically because of the differences and the detail 
that  one  needs  to  go  into  to  start  looking  at  an  impact,  and  impacts  are  much  
further down the line than output (DBSA Respondent 2).
This study argues that if DFIs are to be transformational then outcomes and impacts must be
at the centre of their operations.
5.2.6 Financing Development or Developing Finance?
At the Open Coding stage of data analysis, 57 individual codes were identified. These were
based on literature review and the examination of publicly available information. There was a
significant  variance of  codes between the  various respondents  as  shown in Appendix 3.
However, it  is clear that financial viability is considered as the most common issue in the
impact evaluation tools and systems. An emerging conclusion is that the impact evaluation
systems in place tend to be performative technologies. Accordingly, DFIs occupy the role of
developers of finance instead of financiers of development. According to Bracking (2012), DFI
development impact evaluations are performative because they are marginally related to the
material world which they seek to influence and measure. Performation is defined as, 
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the process whereby socio-technical arrangements are enacted, to constitute so many 
ecological niches within and between which statements and models circulate and are 
true or at least enjoy a high degree of verisimilitude (Callon, 2006, p. 25).
The author identifies key techniques used in the process of performation as: expression, self-
fulfilling prophecies, prescription and performance.
In this study, such examples abound. For instance, as part of his presentation to parliament
the Chief Financial Officer of NHFC, Mr Zola Lupondwana, intimated a self-fulfilling prophecy
about the DFI as follows:
Mr  Zola  Lupondwana,  Chief  Financial  Officer  (CFO),  NHFC,  said  that  since  the  
NHFC  was  a  funding  institution,  a  key  aspect  to  consider  when  looking  at  its  
performance would be the growth in the loan book, the pricing of the loan book and its 
quality (NHFC & NURCHA & RHLF & SHRA 2018/19 Annual Performance Plan, 2018).
Another instance is what the respondent from sefa had to say about the harmony between
financial viability and development impact:
Not necessarily, because I would think for us that is the main important thing that we  
actually make sure that the applicant can afford the loan. As much as they would  
create a lot of jobs, but if they do not afford the loan then those jobs would not really 
matter, meaning that the development impact is not something that as an institution we
really look at, but more look on whether the applicant can  repay  the  loan  (sefa,  
Respondent 2).
Furthermore, across all the cases it was evident that there is subordination of development
impact  to  financial  viability  with  virtually  no  instances  of  projects  rejected  on  account  of
development impact weaknesses.
5.2.7 Policy Implications
This  study  has  confirmed  much  of  what  is  known  globally  about  the  measurement  of
development impact by DFIs. As far as the researcher knows, there is no literature from a
South African perspective. This study is therefore seminal and should provoke more debate
and brings to the fore key policy issues for consideration which are discussed below: 
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Rethinking Impact Evaluation in South African DFIs
It is critical for South African DFIs to relook at what they call impact evaluation systems and
consider a radical shift from measuring outputs towards measuring outcomes and impacts.
For  the  most  part,  DFIs’ main  priority  is  developmental  therefore  their  impact  evaluation
systems should be premised around this objective. The systems should be unambiguous with
a  balance  struck  between  the  cost  of  its  implementation  and  anticipated  benefits.  Most
importantly, whilst most of the existing systems collect some developmental impact data, the
best system is one that collects enough data and not too much data. Impact indicators must
be re-defined and be based on robust research and a credible counterfactual.
Participatory Evaluation
Whilst some evidence of collaboration with investees was identified during the study, there
remains limited input from stakeholders during evaluations. Communities which the DFIs seek
to impact should be involved in impact evaluation; of course this should be assessed against
the relevant costs and benefits. In this regard, Chambers  (2009, p. 246) is instructive with
these remarks:
Many tools can be and should be used for impact assessment. Whatever they are,  
they  must  always  recognise  that  it  is  those  who  live  in  poverty,  those  who  are  
vulnerable,  those  who  are  marginalised,  who  are  the  best  judges  and  the  prime  
authorities on their lives and livelihoods and how they have been affected.
The government as owner of  these DFIs should actively participate in major decisions to
safeguard the rights and needs of the most vulnerable in society. Due regard should be given
to the fact that more finance does not necessarily translate into more development.
DFI Performance Reporting Framework
To safeguard against variations in the meaning of terminologies, data collection, analysis and
impact  evaluation  categories,  the  South  African  Government  must  come  up  with  a  DFI
performance  reporting  framework.  Such  framework,  will  define  sectoral  indicators  and
prescribe  measurement  methodologies  to  allow  for  comparisons  across  DFIs  where
necessary.  Additionally  it  will  allow  for  more  active  involvement  of  the  government  in
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monitoring DFI activities and ensure that development is not relegated to the periphery. This
framework might take the form of an act of  parliament to facilitate broad and transparent
dialogue on DFI activities.
5.3 Limitations
There  were  certain  limitations  which  this  research  was  exposed  to.  Firstly,  most  of  the
interviews were done virtually using Skype, WhatsApp and Telephonically. This constrained
the interviewer’s ability to probe further based on emotions that could have been read from a
face-to-face  interview.  Nevertheless,  interviewees  were  allowed  to  follow  their  trains  of
thought to obtain uncontaminated data. In some cases, as planned, the researcher could not
interview more than one participant at a DFI owing to non-responses. The risk of bias arising
out of this was mitigated by extensive review of secondary data to corroborate the single
interviewee’s responses.
Furthermore, not all the relevant DFI departments were interviewed. The researcher focused
on those people involved in either loan origination, post-investment and development impact
evaluation. However, DFI impact evaluation spans beyond these departments. For instance,
the views of the strategy departments were not solicited except from one interviewee at the
IDC. As noted by Lloyd  (2015), such an approach can result  in biased results by limiting
findings to those who participated in the study. This limitation was mitigated by interviewing
members in  middle-  and senior-management  positions.  Such employees are  expected to
have a deeper understanding of organisational operations. In addition, secondary data was
used to augment interview data. 
At a broader level, the research questions explored in this dissertation were extensive such
that a Master’s dissertation would not do justice to their coverage. That said, the questions
are of immense importance and pave the way for future detailed studies. Finally, only the
supply side of DFI impact evaluation was considered owing to the scope of the study. There
was no explicit solicitation of DFI clients views on the systems and tools in use.
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5.4 Research Conclusions
This minor dissertation set out to explore how South African DFIs measure the impact of their
investments. The main research question sought to understand the tools and systems used
by  South  African  DFIs  to  measure  the  development  impact  of  their  investments.  Closely
related to this was inquiry  into  whether the impact  evaluation systems adopted by South
African National DFIs provide credible, timely and relevant information. Finally, inquiry was
made  into  whether  impact  evaluation  systems  adopted  by  South  African  DFIs  support
evidence-based decision making and learning.
The objective was to make policy recommendations on these tools and systems to ensure
that DFI funding maximised social and economic benefits. This was significant because as far
as the researcher is aware, there is no literature covering developmental impact evaluation
systems used by South African DFIs. The results of this study are consistent with the work of
Bracking  and  Ganho  (2011) on  indicator  weaknesses.  The  study  also  confirms  the
performative  nature  of  development  impact  evaluation  science  as  espoused  by  Bracking
(2012).  At  a  broader  level,  the  theoretical  concepts  on  how DFIs  measure  development
results in (Bortes et al., 2011) are consistent with this study.
Furthermore, this study confirms most of the findings on how DFIs measure their impacts as
per the findings of Lemma (2015).The findings of this study contribute a new understanding of
the landscape for DFIs in South Africa. The study provides a first step in understanding the
impacts of South African DFIs. It is expected that with more in-depth understanding of the
impact evaluation tools used by South African DFIs, understanding the macro-impacts of DFIs
will be enhanced. Furthermore, the research contributes towards DFI policy in South Africa
and proposes a standardised performance evaluation framework.
How do we understand development impact evaluation in the context of South Africa and
resource constrained environments in general? A significant observation in this study is the
effect of political economy on impact evaluation. DFI decisions, including impact evaluation,
are  subordinate  to  political  whims.  An  initial  step  to  impact  evaluation  should  be  an
assessment  of  the  political  settlement.  This  should  be  leveraged  for  the  democratic
governance of  DFIs  and inclusive access to  finance.  Political  settlement is  defined as ‘a
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description of the distribution of power across organizations that are relevant for analysing a
specific institutional or policy problem’ (Khan, 2017, p. 5). Current frameworks are weak on
this requirement. However, this is an important factor that allows policies to be tweaked for
different contexts.
5.5 Future Research Directions
The theory  emerging from this  research will  need to  be  tested at  individual  project  level
across South African National DFIs. This would entail tracking a number of DFI projects from
inception to completion. This will help solidify the theory, enable some nuances to be teased
out and allow for robust generalisation. Undoubtedly, the internal workings of DFIs remain a
key area for future study especially impact evaluation. Whilst there exists a growing body of
literature  on the  developmental  impact  of  projects  and  investments,  gaps still  remain  on
macro and micro effects of DFI investments (Biekpe, 2018).
There remains a number of open questions such as the factors that influence the choices of
the various impact  evaluation tools in  use.  There is  also a need to  expand the research
further by understanding what the shareholder perspective on development impact is. Much
could also be investigated on the nature of governance structures and the impact evaluation
systems in place. Does this impose more restrictions on what can be reported on? Finally
studies can also look at how impact evaluation might be harmonised across the various DFIs.
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Appendix 1: Interview Discussion Guide
Informed Consent
This  research  has  been  approved  by  the  Commerce  Faculty  Ethics  in  Research
Committee.
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You can choose to withdraw from the
research at any time.
The questionnaire will  take approximately  60 minutes to  complete.  You will  not  be
requested  to  supply  any  identifiable  information,  ensuring  anonymity  of  your
responses.
Due to the nature of the study you will need to provide the researchers with some form
of identifiable information however, all responses will be confidential and used for the
purposes of this research only.
Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to contact the
researcher (Francis Garikayi, Cell: +264818577104; Email: fran.garikayi@gmail.com).
________________________________
Signature:
Date and place:
Introduction
Hello and thank you for agreeing to this interview. My name is Francis Garikayi; I  am an
MCOMM Candidate at the UCT GSB researching development impact evaluation systems
used by development finance institutions (DFIs) in South Africa. The results of my study will
help academics, DFIs and government to better understand the development finance model
for maximum socio-economic impact. 
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This interview will be recorded, and transcriptions will be made available to you for revision if
you so  wish.  The  various interviews  will  be  analysed,  and the  results  will  be  put  into  a
dissertation  report  which  will  also  be  made  available.  You  are  free  to  withdraw  your
participation in this interview at any time. I am going to start recording if you do not mind.
Preamble
i. Participant name:……………………………………………
ii. Date of interview:……………………………………………
iii. Participant’s organisation:………………………………………………..
iv. Currently  working  for  a  DFI  or  have  worked  for  a  DFI  in  the  past  6
months………………..
v. Participant position ………………………………………………………………..
-Probe on what the role entails. 
1. What is the understanding of the meaning of development impact?
a. What is your understanding of development impact?
b. What is your understanding of a development impact evaluation system?
2. What development impact systems are used?
a. What are the key elements of an investment that you measure or focus on?
b. What  tools  or  systems  do  you  use  to  measure  development  impact  of
investments?
c. From  the  list  below,  select  the  environmental,  social  and  governance
pillars/elements that you measure:
d. What  other  pillars/elements  of  development  impact  not  listed  above  do  you
measure?
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Environmental Social Governance
Climate Change Human rights and labour
standards
Tax avoidance
Water Employee relations Executive pay
Corruption
Director nominations
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….....
e. The  Principles  for  Responsible  Investment  (“PRI”)  is  the  world’s  leading
proponent of responsible investment. 
i. Are you aware of PRI?..............................
ii. Is your DFI a signatory of the PRI?....................................
3. What development impact evaluation methodologies are used?
a. Does the owner (in this case ‘the owner’ refers to the government authority
responsible for monitoring the DFI for instance the line Ministry) have a formal
role in monitoring development impact either before investments are made, or
after?
-Probe on the process followed.
b. Are there additional evaluation and review activities in place which oversee the
investments undertaken by your institution - other than formal systems - which
contribute  to  raising  development  impact,  such  as  assigned  and  permanent
advisors, expert visits, training?
-Probe how often these reviews are done.
c. What  are  the  categories  or  types of  external  service  providers  who provide
development impact assessment services to your organisation?
-Probe more on the external consultants doing the impact evaluation 
-Big or small consulting firms
-Former employees
d. How is development impact scored in your organisation?
4. What are the development impact pillars/elements measured by the DFIs? 
a. Is the development impact assessment done before an investment is made as
part of the pre-investment decision-making process?
-Probe on who does this pre-investment development assessment.
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b. What are the most important pillars/elements that are assessed pre-investment
decision-making?
c. Of the pillars/elements identified in 4.2.  above, allocate 10 points to indicate
importance  of  the  pillar/element  with  1  indicating  low  importance  and  10
indicating high importance.
d. Is the development impact assessment done after an investment is made and
who does this assessment?
e. What are the most important pillars/elements that are assessed post-investment
decision-making?
f. Of the pillars/elements identified in 4.4.  above, allocate 10 points to indicate
importance  of  the  pillar/element  with  1  indicating  low  importance  and  10
indicating high importance.
5. Is there a relationship between the different development impact assessment tools
used?
a. How do the pre- and post-investment development impact tools interact?
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b. In  your  opinion,  is  there  harmony between investment  financial  viability  and
development impact?
6. What is the credibility and relevance of information provided by development impact
evaluation systems?
a. Do you use bespoke development indicators by industrial sector?
b. Who ‘signs off’ investments as worth making against expected developmental
impact?
c. Do you enter into investment agreements with third parties?
d. After an investment agreement has been reached between your institution and a
third party,  which makes the manager promise to invest within certain limits,
what subsequent checks does your organisation make, and how often?
e. Does the investment agreement with third parties mandate the use of a specific
development impact assessment tool?
f. Do third party entities present a development impact case on behalf of all their
underlying investee companies as a group, or individually to your institution?
g. Do you consider information provided by your development impact assessment
tool useful and why/ why not?
7. Do Impact Evaluation Systems adopted by DFIs support evidence-based decision
making and learning?
a. How is the assessment of a bankable or doable investment assessed in your
organisation? 
b. Have there been any instances in which investments were not made based on
development impact weaknesses?
c. Does post-investment development impact evaluation lead to changes in similar
projects in the following or subsequent investments made and if so, is there a
systematic way in which this feedback is managed?
8. Are development impact assessment reporting mechanisms effective?
a. In  your  estimation,  what  percentage  of  total  development  impact  evaluation
assessments or reports does your organisation publish in a public domain?
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b. What would you say are the strengths and weaknesses of the development
impact assessment that you use?
c. What  recommendations  would  you  make  to  improve  development  impact
assessment tools used by DFIs?
d. If possible, can you share a copy of a recent development impact evaluation
document/ report?
Thank you very much for your time. Who else would you recommend that I interview in your
organisation?
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6 Appendix 2: Theme Frequency across Interviews
Figure 11: Code Frequency in Interviews
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7 Appendix 3 Key Quotes from Interviews
Topics related to tools and systems used to measure development impact.
Core Category Causal influences Representative quotes
Development
impact is defined
Shareholder
mandate
We define development according to South African circumstances, which focuses on
transformation  of  the  agricultural  sector.  So,  bringing  in  new  emerging  farmers  –
specifically black farmers – into the sector. We define development around economic
growth, so whatever we do we match economic growth (Land Bank, Respondent 1).
For us development impact is directly related to the sort of measurable impact that we
make within the sector, which are different things for us. One of the things, it is directly
as a result of units that have been built directly as a result of leveraging, so we also
look at that (NHFC, Respondent 2).
Existence  of  a
development
impact
evaluation
system
Organisational
operating
procedures
Yes, it is part of the financial model and also the system that we use, which is called
sefaLAS (Small Enterprise Finance Agency- Loan Administration System), so we use
that to calculate the number of jobs that would be created. And also the ownership of it
Is it  by youth or a black person or a woman? So, we use two tools which are the
financial model and the sefaLAS system (sefa, Respondent 2).
We  use  SAP,  the  programme,  which  is  custom  built  to  meet  our  organisation’s
objectives (IDC, Respondent 1).
87
Core Category Causal influences Representative quotes
Development
impact
evaluation
personnel/
Business  units/
Departments
Organisational
operating
procedures
We have developed a scorecard from our side, but the scorecard is completed by the
bankers that have first-line interface with clients,  and that  is reviewed by the credit
committee. So even though the banker does it, it is verified by the credit committee
(Land Bank, Respondent 1).
The  person  working  on  the  transaction,  whether  it  is  the  analyst  or  the  account
manager or the senior account manager (IDC, Respondent 1).
Timing  of
development
impact
evaluation
Reporting
requirements
Organisational
procedures
We do not do an entire development impact assessment before. We have an appraisal
system that the project would go through prior to funding, and then once the project is
finished, I mean, the assessment does not specifically speak to development impact
(DBSA, Respondent 2).
Yes, absolutely, as we put together the proposal to take to our credit committees we
also look at the impact that we will be getting from that development and utilise some of
it as motivating factors. Particularly projects that have maybe certain challenges, we
utilise the impact that we will get as part of the motivation of some of our projects. So
we definitely do look at it pre-investment. (NHFC, Respondent 2).
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Core Category Causal influences Representative quotes
Owner
participation  in
impact
evaluation
Governance
requirements
Shareholder
compact
Yes, we provide them with quarterly information about the performance of the DFI (NEF,
Respondent 1).
So, they sort of monitor to make sure that we achieve our mandate in that regard by
putting in these targets on a rolling five-year term. And they also do it post-investment
by checking against our targets. So, we send an update on our performance targets on
a quarterly basis to the shareholder (NHFC, Respondent 2).
Before the financial year commences, by the end of February every year in terms of the
Public  Finance  Management  Act  the  minister  and  the  board  need  to  enter  into  a
shareholder compact. And part of that shareholder compact is basically a performance
agreement between the minister and the board to say this is what the company is going
to achieve in this financial year (IDC, Respondent 1).
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Outcomes  of
Interest/
Indicators
Shareholder
mandate
So, one of the first things in our scorecard is the transformation component, so, to what
extent  are we allocating funds towards black farmers, or emerging farmers,  or new
black farmers, or existing black farmers, or black workers that want to be part of an
employee  farm ownership  scheme? So  it  is  defined  in  terms  of  race,  gender  and
geographical location. That would be the things that we would measure as our first
thing. The second thing on our scorecard is the environmental and social sustainability.
So we would report and measure which transactions are high risk, low risk, medium
risk, and basically what are the consequences or what are the risks we are exposed to
(Land Bank, Respondent 1).
Outcomes  of
Interest/
Indicators
Shareholder
mandate
I think the main one is that the business is sustainable, so when we do the assessment
of the business we need to be sure that even after we have given them funding they are
able to sustain themselves. The jobs that they will be creating will be sustainable in the
long run, and also the impact that they will have on the economy is an impact that is
sustainable.  So that  is  the  key thing to  look at.  And also the  affordability,  that  the
business can actually afford the loan that we are giving them (sefa, Respondent 2).
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Outcomes  of
Interest/
Indicators
Shareholder
mandate
It  obviously depends on each project, but generally we measure, it depends on the
project. If it is a road project, the output is the kilometres of road; your outcomes would
be a reduction in travel time. It depends on the project, but your outputs are pretty easy
to measure depending on what project you are doing. Your outcomes would speak to
what the output result is. So yes, depending on the project. We look at jobs, obviously;
we look at impact on gender; sustainability, environmental, if it is an energy project,
impact on biodiversity, that sort of thing (DBSA, Respondent 2).
Complementarity
of  ex-ante  and
ex-post tools
Organisational
procedures
At the moment there is  a  limited kind of  interaction and I  think our  monitoring and
evaluation person that we have just employed, they are actually trying to find a way of
making sure that the pre and post do interact. So we do not have good harmony at the
moment, but we are working towards that (Land Bank, Respondent 1).
In my opinion there is not a relationship at all, because of the way that our performance
management systems are structured. They are at the core of what drives this short-
term (indistinct) in the organisation. So, we basically live from year to year. We live to
meet the performance targets which have been set. So, there is little to no value for us
in assessing the developmental impact, at least not in the short to medium term (IDC,
Respondent 1).
Table 8: Tools and Systems used to Measure Development Impact
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Topics related to credibility, timeliness and relevancy of development impact information.
Core Category Causal influences Representative quotes
There  is  a
balance
between
investment
financial  viability
and
development
impact
Organisational
operational
procedures
No, I  would not  say there is.  Because sometimes you might  find that  if  there is an
opportunity  to  automate  in  the  business  that  you  are  funding,  which  would  have  a
negative  impact  on  jobs,  commercial  viability  might  say  automate  and  reduce
overheads, but the developmental impact obligations will say create as many jobs as
you  can.  So  there  is  not,  in  my  opinion,  any  harmony  between  the  two  (IDC,
Respondent 1). 
There can be a bit of disjuncture sometimes but, I mean, they are playing equal roles.
For  the  business  to  have  a  full  developmental  impact  it  must  be  financially  viable
because you do not want to have a business that is there, that is, what is called―a
business that is what we call a white elephant in South Africa, that is just there. The
building is there or, the plant is there but it is of no use. So, both of them should have an
alliance. A beautiful property or plant and is not financially viable and there will not be
developmental  impact  because  people  will  not  be  employed.  If  it  was  an  export  or
manufacturing facility there won’t be anything like that (NEF, Respondent 1).
Publication  of
development
impact
information
Reporting
requirements
Shareholder
mandate
We do not actually put anything in the public domain. What if our clients do not want the
information made public? So we attempt not to put all the impact information out there
(DBSA, Respondent 2).
I would say we publish 100% of it, because as a government-owned institution we need
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Core Category Causal influences Representative quotes
Organisational
operational
procedures
to have annual financial statements that are released to the public on an annual basis,
so development impact is reported in there (NHFC, Respondent 2).
Overall  scoring
of  development
impact
Organisational
operating
procedures
Through  a  Developmental  Scorecard  that  is  primarily  used  in  giving  subsidies  and
developmental  discounts  on  pricing.  The  score  is  a  weighted  composite  of  all  the
developmental indicators we consider (IDC, Respondent 2).
There is a development impact scorecard, and there are a number of indicators where it
is rated, and the rating is given a percentage. It is like a 1-2-3-4, but 1 means  10%, 2
means 20%, that kind of thing (Land Bank, Respondent 1).
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Development
impact  affects
the  Investment
Decision  (Who
‘signs  off’
investments  as
worth  making
against  expected
developmental
impact?)
Organisational
operating
procedures
The Credit Committee (Transaction evaluating Committee) (IDC, Respondent 1).
The executive signs off the projects. It is not just necessarily always done against an
output, development output, it is done considering information that is being provided. So
we would not sign off  something against an output.  But  you do look at the project
documentation,  which  include the  environmental  and  social  and  development  and
institutional  and governance issues, and then the whole document is signed off,  not
specific to the development results of the project that it is signed off. Obviously there is
an understanding that  if  you do the project  you will  gain  the following development
results. But it is not only signed off if, you know, there is a much broader way you have
to look at things (DBSA, Respondent 2).
Our credit committees, so to speak, would sign off on that because all proposals are
taken to our credit committees and the prerogative of the investment committee is to
approve on either financial or an impact basis. So they would sign off on that (NHFC,
Respondent 2).
Table 9: Credibility, Timeliness and Relevancy of Development Impact Information
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Topics related to impact evaluation supporting evidence-based decision making and learning.
Core category Causal influences Representative quotes
Development 
impact 
weakness can 
result in projects
being rejected
Organisational 
operating 
procedures
It is not that they would not have been made, what would happen is that you would have
to negotiate or discuss with the client to raise the development impact of the proposed
project. So, it does not mean that you stop a transaction (Land Bank, Respondent 1). 
No, not in my experience. Because, like I said, if an investment is commercially viable 
then the only thing standing between me meeting my target and not meeting my target 
is the development impact score. Then you can manipulate the number. I am being 
honest, it is like up to people; if you have people who are dishonest then people can 
change and say no, actually this model can carry 50 more people (IDC, Respondent 1).
Post-investment
assessments 
affects future 
decisions
Organisational 
operating 
procedures
For all the deals that we do we provide lessons learned as to what was the lesson we
have learnt there. So that when a new deal is done the committee is using lessons
learned by us (NEF, Respondent 1).
No, we are prompted. I think it is more based on our credit submissions that there is a
section where they would ask: have we actually received a PIM report, which is post-
investment monitoring report, which would tell us more about the industry and the clients
that we deal with? (sefa, Respondent 2).
Systematic  way
of  managing
post-investment
Organisational 
operating 
procedures
Yes, we have a data management system and then internally within the unit we have a
place  where  we  put  all  our  information  and  evaluations  and  everything  (DBSA,
Respondent 2).
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impact
evaluation
feedback.
No,  I  would not  say so.  I  think a lot  of  what  happens post-investment,  the lessons
learned and stuff, they are kept in pockets within the organisation. So there is not a
system where you share learnings and reflect as a collective. It is more the particular
people who were involved in that transaction who will know, or the head of the unit, or
the credit committee which was involved in that transaction might say ‘but this did not
work’ (IDC, Respondent 1).
It does lead to different outcomes because you have a credit committee that looks at all
the transactions. So, if  it  is identified that there are similarities in transactions where
there could be improvements in development impact, they would recommend that the
project is reviewed to take account of the lessons learned from the other projects (Land
Bank, Respondent 1).
Table 10: Evidence-based Decision Making and Learning
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